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I. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE NO. 1:

Should this Court exercise its certiorari discretion to review the

decision of the Court of Appeals where the Court of Appeals (a) ignored the standard applicable to
review of a district court's decision on a Rule 11 motion and ignored the fact that the district court
failed to make any determination as to whether Rule 11 was violated, (b) erroneously construed the
district court's ruling, (c) the construction of the district court's ruling attached by the Court of
Appeals would be clearly erroneous and not supported by any evidence in the record, (d) the Court
of Appeals' conclusion that the constitutional issues raised by petitioners were not preserved in the
district court is clearly erroneous and contrary to the record presented to the Court of Appeals, (e)
the Court of Appeals' Decision fails entirely to address petitioners' appeal of the district court's
order denying sanctions under Rule 45, Utah R. Civ. P., and (f) the Court of Appeals
misapprehended the manner in which petitioners' constitutional arguments relate to the appeal.
ISSUE NO. 2:

Should this Court exercise its' certiorari discretion to address and

resolve the important constitutional and public policy issues presented in connection with
petitioners' appeal? Specifically, should this Court exercise its discretion to address and resolve the
following two questions:
(1)

given this Court's prior ruling that a constitutional right of privacy exists with

respect to one's financial and banking records, is a litigant required to provide prior
notice to a non-party that the litigant is subpoenaing the non-parties' confidential
financial information from the non-party's financial institution; and
(2)

is it improper for an attorney to delegate to his or her secretary the authority

to sign subpoenas, deposition notices and other papers to be filed with the courts?

1

II. OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals' Decision dated 11 December 1997 (the "Decision"), and its decision
denying petitioners' petition for rehearing dated 7 January 1998 are not reported. Copies of the
Court of Appeals' Decisions and the decision denying petitioners' petition for rehearing are attached
as Exhibits 1 and 2, respectively, to the Appendix to this Petition for Writ of Certiorari.1
III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Petitioners appealed the final order of the Honorable Pat B. Brian, Third District Court Judge,
entered on 15 October 1996 in Case No. 954300067 DA, Third Judicial District Court, Summit
County, State of Utah. The Decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed was entered on
11 December 1997. The decision of the Court of Appeals denying petitioners' petition for rehearing
was entered on 7 January 1998. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2.
IV. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES
1.

Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P.; Appendix, Exhibit 7.

2.

Rule 26, Utah R. Civ. P.; Appendix, Exhibit 8.

2.

Rule 30, Utah R. Civ. P.; Appendix, Exhibit 9.

3.

Rule 45, Utah R. Civ. P.; Appendix, Exhibit 10.

4.

Article I, Section 14, Utah Constitution; Appendix, Exhibit 11.

5.

Form 30 Notice to Persons Served with a Subpoena; Appendix, Exhibit 6.
V. STATEMENT OF CASE

This petition stems from the Defendant's violation of petitioners' constitutional rights to
privacy in confidential banking records, and Defendant's blatant misuse of the subpoena power, in

!

In addition to the foregoing decisions, the following decisions of the trial court are relevant to the
disposition of this matter: (a) Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, 5/16/96, Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings,
8/23/96, Order, 10/15/96. The foregoing are attached as Exhibits 3, 4 and 5, respectively, to the Appendix
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violation of Rules 11 and 45, Utah R. Civ. P. Petitioners, Terry Frank ("Frank") and Park City
Pharmacy, Inc. ("PCP"), were not parties in the district court action below, but were the target of
improperly issued and executed subpoenas. Specifically, Frank was served with two (2) subpoenas
which were invalid because, inter alia, they were signed not by Defendant's attorney, Mitch Olsen
("Mr. Olsen"), but by Mr. Olsen's secretary, in violation of Rules 11 and 45, Utah R. Civ. P.
Additionally, PCP's confidential banking records were subpoenaed, seized and used by the
Defendant/Appellee Audrey N. Holt (the "Defendant") without any prior notice being given to PCP,
in violation of Utah R. Civ. P. 45, and in violation of PCP's constitutional right of privacy in its
banking records.
On 17 May 1995, Clifford E. Holt ("Plaintiff) filed a complaint for divorce against the
Defendant. The divorce proceeding was highly contested and hostile. As a result, for a divorce
proceeding, the Defendant pursued unusually extensive non-party discovery, primarily through the
use of subpoenas. Two (2) of the targets of Defendant's non-party subpoena discovery were
petitioners. Frank is, and always has been, the sole shareholder of PCP.
In connection with Defendant's discovery efforts, Mr. Olsen's secretary signed at least 26
subpoenas, deposition notices and other papers filed with the district court, including the subpoenas
and deposition notices served on Frank. In addition to being invalid because these documents were
signed by Mr. Olsen's secretary, the subpoenas did not contain the requisite notice to persons served
with the subpoena as embodied in Utah R. Civ. P. Form 30, nor did it allow Frank the requisite
minimum fourteen days within which to produce documents as required by Rule 45.
In the interim, and unbeknownst to petitioners, Defendant had already purported to serve a
subpoena on Bank One purporting to require Bank One to produce all of PCP's banking records for
the prior three years. This subpoena was apparently sent to Bank One via a letter dated 14 February
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1996, and did not contain the requisite notice to persons served with a subpoena. Curiously, despite
serving the subpoena on Bank One on 14 February 1996, Defendant did not provide Plaintiff any
notice of the Bank One subpoena until 11 March 1996, after Defendant had already obtained PCP's
confidential banking records. Then, despite their knowledge that Frank asserted he was the sole
shareholder of PCP, neither Defendant nor her counsel ever provided notice of the Bank One
subpoena to Frank or PCP. Instead, Defendant used PCP's banking records in a deposition, while
a motion for protective order, seeking protection of PCP confidential financial records, was pending.
Upon being served with Defendant's improper subpoenas, petitioners filed a motion for
protective order/motion to quash and sought to recover its' fees and expenses incurred in connection
with filing of that motion. Petitioners' motion for protective order was granted at the 16 May 1996
hearing, at which time the district court took under advisement the issue of whether to award fees
and costs. Subsequent to that hearing, Defendant filed a frivolous motion for sanctions against
petitioners, claiming that Mr. Frank had improperly failed to appear and produce documents at a
deposition to which Mr. Frank had filed a timely objection. Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion
for sanctions under Rules 11 and 45, Utah R. Civ. P. The motion for sanctions and petitioners'
previously pending request for an award of attorneys' fees was heard by the district court on 23
August 1996. At that hearing, the district court re-emphasized the fact that it had granted petitioners'
motion for protective order by ordering Defendant to deliver to petitioners the originals and all
copies of any and all documents which Defendant had obtained from petitioners' bank. The district
court denied, however, petitioners' motion for sanctions and request for attorneys' fees.
Petitioners filed a timely notice of appeal, which was denied by the Utah Court of Appeals
pursuant to the Court of Appeals Decision dated 11 December 1997. The Court of Appeals
subsequently denied petitioners' petition for rehearing pursuant to an order dated 7 January 1998.
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VI. STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Because this matter focuses on the improper use of subpoenas in non-party discovery,

a brief introduction of Defendant's counsel is appropriate. Defendant was represented by Mitchell J.
Olsen of the law firm Olsen & Olsen L.L.C. Mr. Olsen is an experienced domestics law attorney. He
has practiced since 1982 (almost 16 years), and charges $150.00 per hour in domestic cases. (R. 785786).
2.

For a divorce proceeding, Defendant pursued unusually extensive non-party discovery

through the use of subpoenas, subpoenas duces tecum, notices of deposition and notices of records
deposition, consisting of subpoenas to approximately 26 non-parties, most of which are specifically
identified on pp. 10-11 of petitioners' Brief of the Appellants.
3.

On 14 February 1996, Mr. Olsen served, via a letter, a subpoena on Bank One wherein

Mr. Olsen sought to require Bank One to produce the banking records for PCP for the prior three
years. R. 0800-0803. Curiously, it was only a month later, after he had already obtained PCP's
confidential documents from Bank One, that Mr. Olsen finally notified the Plaintiffs counsel of the
Bank One subpoena. Mr. Olsen never provided any notice whatsoever to Frank or PCP of the
subpoena to Bank One. See R. 0349-0350, 0798-0802.
4.

On 7 March 1996, Frank supplied Mr. Olsen with an affidavit, and testified:
I am the sole owner of Park City Pharmacy located in Park City. Cliff Holt is
an employee only.

R. 333, paragraph 3.
5.

All of Mr. Olsen's subpoenas of PCP's banking records were concealed from PCP.

No one in a representative capacity for PCP was served with the other bank subpoenas and related
deposition notices. See R. 262-270,281-283, 349-350, and 798-803. PCP became aware of all of Mr.
Olsen's subpoenas of PCP's bank records in reviewing the record for this appeal.
5

6.

Mr. Olsen's subpoenas were issued without supplying to the subpoenaed banks the

Utah R. Civ. P. Form 30 Notice or anything substantially similar thereto. See, e.g., R. 304-308, 373377, 402-410, and 611-616. Indeed, the district court record is devoid of any evidence that Mr. Olsen
provided the requisite prior notice or substance of the Form 30 Notice to any subpoenaed non-party.
7.

Mr. Olsen did not sign many of the subpoenas and related deposition notices; rather,

at least 26 subpoenas, deposition notices and other papers filed with the district court were signed by
Mr. Olsen's secretary, Liz Beall.2 See, e.g. R. 0335-0346, 0353-0370, 0378-0380, 0396-0410, 04190422, 0467-0472, 0523-0524, 0548-0552. Indeed, Mr. Olsen has admitted that he allowed his
secretary to sign the documents in question. R. 610.
8.

Frank was served with two (2) subpoenas and deposition notices which were signed

by Mr. Olsen's secretary. The subpoena duces tecum served on Mr. Frank did not allow him the
requisite 14 days in which to respond, and did not contain the the Form 30 Notice to the subpoenaed
parties. Additionally, Frank was served, in his individual capacity, with a subpoena duces tecum
demanding he produce documents belonging to PCP, a separate legal entity. See R. 406
9.

Mr. Olsen's secretary improperly signed and purported to serve subpoenas upon non-

parties located in the States of New York, California, Colorado, Florida, and Washington. See R. 258,
260-266, 271-272, 273-274, 275-276, 277-278, 279-280, and 345-346.

2

It took a while for Frank, PCP, and their counsel to discover this impropriety. In responding to Frank's
Motion for Protective Order and to Quash, Mr. Olsen submitted an affidavit outlining the attorneys fees and costs
purportedly incurred with respect to the discovery at issue. A copy of Mr. Olsen's Affidavit (R. 538-541) is Exhibit
7 to the Appendix. The signature page (R. 540) shows Mr. Olsen's authentic signature, and the signature of Ms.
Beall (her own signature) notarizing the affidavit. The signature on Mr. Olsen's affidavit perplexed counsel for
Frank and PCP: a completely different signature appeared on the subpoena and deposition notice served upon
Frank, which were at issue. A copy of the Frank subpoena duces tecum (R. 543-546) is Exhibit 8 to the Appendix.
A copy of the related deposition notice (R. 548-550) is Exhibit 9 to the Appendix. Upon further inspection, Frank
and PCP solved the mystery: In the letter supplied to Frank with the Frank subpoena and deposition notice, Ms.
Beall signed Mr. Olsen's name "Mitchell J. Olsen/Lb" indicating that she signed the letter on behalf of Mr. Olsen.
A comparison of the various documents conclusively shows that Ms. Beall signed Mr. Olsen's signature on the
Frank subpoena and deposition notice.
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10.

Mr. Olsen's discovery abuse did not stop with the improper use of subpoenas. Indeed,

Defendant used some of PCP's banking records after Frank had filed a motion for protective order
with the district court, but before the district court ruled on the motion. In that motion, PCP and
Frank, specifically sought the protection of PCP's confidential banking records from unrestricted
public disclosure. Moreover, this occurred after the district court had already granted a Protective
Order to another non-party ordering exclusion of most of his banking records and protection of the
few documents requiring production R. 454.
11.

On 1 April 1996, petitioners filed a motion for protective order/motion to quash to

prevent the disclosure of Frank's personal and PCP's confidential financial information. R. 411-430.
12..

In their motion for protective order, Frank and PCP sought protection of Frank's

personal and PCP's "banking records." R. 414 to 416. After Frank filed the motion for protective
order, but before the district court ruled on that motion, Mr. Olsen used in a deposition, and thus
publicly published the very types of confidential financial records which were the subject of the
pending motion for protective order. R. 586.3
13.

Notwithstanding Frank's pending motion for protective order and motion to quash, and

notwithstanding the great limitations placed by the district court upon discovery of similar banking
records relating to Plaintiffs father, Mr. Olsen used and publicly published PCP's banking records,
while keeping secret from Frank and PCP his possession of the same. R. 525-597.

Petitioners acknowledge that, as a technical matter, their motion for protective order was not directed
toward the Bank One subpoena. However, this is only because Mr. Olsen never disclosed to PCP or its attorneys
the fact that he had already served the subpoena on Bank One and had already obtained PCP's confidential banking
records. Indeed, although Mr. Olsen and counsel for Frank and PCP had corresponded and discussed issues
telephonically, no information was ever conveyed to counsel for Frank and PCP to suggest that the confidential
bank records of PCP had been obtained from Bank One and were already in Mr. Olsen's possession. The facts and
circumstances relating to Mr. Olsen's devious conduct in this regard are set forth in Frank's Reply in Support of his
Motion for Protective Order and to Quash (R. 525-552), and Frank and PCP's Motion for Sanctions (R. 553-597).

7

14.

Frank and PCP's motion for protective order was granted by the district court on 16

May 1996. However, the district court took the issues of fees under advisement. See R. 0739; 07290730; 0732; 0733; 0737; 0744.
15.

On 23 August 1996, the district court ordered that Defendant return to PCP all PCP's

banking records which Defendant had obtained from Bank One. R. 0872-0873. Additionally, the
district court denied Frank's and PCP's request for attorneys' fees and sanctions, stating:
As I recall, this case has represented a very acrimonious, cantankerous,
long, drawn-out lawsuit, where there have been allegations and counter
allegations of deceit and subterfuge and concealment and
noncompliance and noncooperation, ad nauseam. Let's just leave it
alone, and let both sides bare whatever costs you have incurred in
pursuing it or defending or counter-defense or counter-pursuit and
understand that the case is over now."
R. 0874.
16.

Although the district court denied petitioners' request for attorneys' fees, the district

court failed to rule on the primary issue of whether Mr. Olsen's conduct violated Rules 11 and 45,
UtahR. Civ. P. SeeR. 861-876, 810-811.
17.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the district court made a finding of fact that petitioners

"had created considerable difficulties in the discovery process." Court of Appeals Decision at 2,
Exhibit 1 to the Appendix.
18.

The Court of Appeals failed to rule on the primary issue of whether Mr. Olsen's

conduct violated Rules 11 and 45, Utah R. Civ. P. Court of Appeals Decision, Exhibit 1 to Appendix.
19.

The Court of Appeals found that although petitioners presented a number of

"...interesting and serious constitutional arguments, they failed to indicate where these issues appear
in the record as presented to the trial court as required by Rule 25 [sic](a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure." Court of Appeals Decision, n.l, Exhibit 1 to Appendix. The Court of Appeals
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then appeared to conclude that as a result of such failure, petitioners had failed to preserve the
constitutional arguments in the trial court. See id.
VII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This court should exercise its discretion to review the Court of Appeals' Decision because:
•

The Court of Appeals ignored the standard applicable to review of a district court's
decision on a Rule 11 motion, and ignored the fact that the district court failed to make
any determination as to whether Rule 11 was violated;

•

The Court of Appeals' determination that the district court made a factual finding that
the petitioners had created difficulties in the discovery process misapprehends the
district court's ruling;

•

Assuming arguendo that the district court made a factual finding that petitioners had
created difficulty in the discovery process, such a factual finding is clearly erroneous
and is not supported by any evidence in the record;

•

The Court of Appeals' conclusion that the constitutional issues raised by petitioners
were not preserved in the district court is clearly erroneous and clearly contrary to the
record;

•

The Court of Appeals' decision fails to address petitioners' appeal of the district
court's order denying sanctions under Rule 45, Utah R. Civ. P.; and

•

The Court of Appeals misapprehended the manner in which petitioners' constitutional
arguments relate to the appeal.

Even if this Court elects not to review the Court of Appeals' ruling with respect to the denial
of sanctions, this Court should exercise its certiorari discretion to resolve the important constitutional
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and public policy issues presented in petitioners' appeal. Specifically, petitioners' request that this
Court address and resolve the following issues:
•

given this Court's prior ruling that a constitutional right of privacy exists with respect
to one's financial and banking records, is a litigant required to provide prior notice to
a non-party that the litigant is subpoenaing the non-parties' confidential financial
information from the non-party's financial institution; and

•

is it improper for an attorney to delegate to his or her secretary the authority to sign
subpoenas, deposition notices and other papers to be filed with the courts?

These issues are ones which virtually every trial lawyer in the State of Utah may face. It is
appropriate for this Court to offer guidance to the members of the Bar on these important issues.
VIII. ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS CERTIORARI DISCRETION
BECAUSE, IN RENDERING ITS DECISION, THE COURT OF APPEALS
SIGNIFICANTLY STRAYED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.
A.

THE COURT O F APPEALS IGNORED THE STANDARD APPLICABLE T O REVIEW
O F A DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION ON A RULE 11 MOTION, AND IGNORED
THE FACT THAT THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED T O MAKE A
DETERMINATION AS T O WHETHER RULE 11 WAS VIOLATED.

Before a trial court can properly award or deny sanctions under Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P., the
trial court must first determine whether Rule 11 has been violated. See, e.g., Taylor v. Estate of
Taylor, 110 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah 1989) ("[i]f a Rule 11 violation is shown, an appropriate sanction is
mandated"). The Court of Appeals appears to have recognized this rule, as it identified the following
as the standard applicable to review of a trial court's determination with respect to a Rule 11 motion:
we review the trial court's conclusion that rule 11 was or was not violated under a
correction of error standard and the trial court's determination of the type and amount
of sanction under an abuse of discretion standard.

10

Court of Appeals' Decision at 1, Exhibit 1 to the Appendix.
Although this two (2) prong analysis identified by the Court of Appeals is correct in so far as
it goes,4 the Court of Appeals ignored the first prong of the standard which it identified in its Decision.
Specifically, the Court of Appeals failed to address the issue of the "trial court's conclusion that rule
11 was or was not violated . . ." Such failure is important because one of the major flaws of the
district court's ruling from which petitioners appealed was the district court's failure to rule on this
issue. Otherwise stated, even though the district court was presented with a motion for sanctions
under Rule 11, the court never made any determination as to whether Rule 11 had been violated.
Rather, the district court skipped over this fundamental condition precedent to determining what
sanctions, if any, to impose under Rule 11, and simply ruled it was not going to award sanctions. The
Court of Appeals' failure to address this fundamental flaw with the district court's order is important
because, as this Court has previously made clear, "[i]f a Rule 11 violation is shown, an appropriate
sanction is mandated."

Taylor, 770 P.2d at 171. Having failed to make the fundamental

determination as to whether Rule 11 was violated, it was improper for the district court, and
subsequently the Court of Appeals, to refuse to award any sanctions at all under Rule 11.
B.

THE COURT O F APPEALS' DETERMINATION THAT THE DISTRICT COURT MADE A
FACTUAL FINDING THAT PETITIONERS HAD CREATED DIFFICULTIES IN THE
DISCOVERY PROCESS MISAPPREHENDS THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING.

The primary reason stated by the Court of Appeals as grounds for affirmance of the district
court's denial of Rule 11 sanctions was that

This Court has made clear that there is actually a three-pronged analysis which applies to the review of a
trial court's Rule 11 determination. See, e.g., Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1992) (appellate courts should
use a three standard approach in reviewing a trial court's Rule 11 findings: the appellate court must (1) review the
trial court's finding of fact under the clearly erroneous standard; (2) review the trial court's ultimate conclusion that
Rule 11 was violated under the correction of error standard; and (3) review the trial court's determination as to the
type and amount of sanction to be opposed under the abuse of discretion standard).

11

The trial court was clearly of the mind that the parties to this appeal each had
created considerable difficulties in the discovery process. ..
This conclusion is erroneous and misapprehends the district court's statement to which the Court of
Appeals referred. The district court did not make any factual finding that petitioners had created any
difficulties in the discovery process. Rather, the district court specifically concluded that it was the
parties to the underlying action, i.e., the Defendant Audrey Holt and her ex-husband Clifford Holt,
who had created difficulties in the discovery process. Specifically, the district court stated:
As I recall, this case has represented a very acrimonious, cantankerous, long,
drawn-out lawsuit, where there have been allegations and counter allegations
of deceit and subterfuge and concealment and noncompliance and
noncooperation ad nauseam.
R. 0874. In making this statement, the district court was referring specifically to the Plaintiff and
Defendant in the underlying action - the district court was not referring to petitioners.5
C.

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE DISTRICT COURT MADE A FACTUAL FINDING
THAT PETITIONERS HAD CREATED DIFFICULTY IN THE DISCOVERY PROCESS, SUCH
FACTUAL FINDING IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY
EVIDENCE IN T H E RECORD.

Assuming, arguendo, the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the district court's ruling is
correct, and that the district court did conclude that petitioners created difficulties in the discovery
process, such "finding of fact" is clearly erroneous because it is not supported by any evidence in the

5

On the contrary, at the 16 May 1996 hearing, the district court specifically found that petitioners' motion
for protective order was well taken, as the district court granted petitioners' motion for protective order. See, e.g,
Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at R. 0730, 0738. Similarly, at the 23 August 1996 hearing the district court
again expressly recognized that petitioners' motion for protective order was well taken as the district court ordered
the Defendant to destroy all documents in her possession which had been unlawfully obtained from Bank One. See,
e.g., Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at R. 0872-0873.
Furthermore, there is no question that the underlying litigation was long, drawn-out and cantankerous, and
that the parties to the underlying litigation — i.e., the Defendant and her ex-husband, had engaged in objectionable
conduct. However, the fact that the Defendant and her ex-husband engaged in improper conduct in the underlying
litigation cannot provide a proper basis for the district court and Court of Appeals to refuse to impose sanctions on
the Defendant and her counsel. The improper conduct engaged in by the Defendant and her ex-husband simply
does not give the Defendant and her counsel the right to trample on petitioners' constitutional rights, and to engage
in patent violations of Rule 11.
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record. Petitioners had nothing whatsoever to do with the underlying litigation until Terry Frank was
served with a subpoena in March 1996, a year and a half after the underlying litigation had been
commenced. The record is devoid of any evidence whatsoever that Petitioners created any difficulties
in the discovery process. On the contrary, petitioners sought simply to protect their constitutional
rights of privacy in their private financial records. Filing a motion to protect such rights can in no way
be construed as creating difficulties in the discovery process. There simply is no evidence in the
record to support any determination that petitioners created difficulties in the discovery process and,
accordingly, any such finding of fact by the district court, and subsequent basis for ruling by the Court
of Appeals, is clearly erroneous.
D.

T H E COURT O F APPEALS' CONCLUSION THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
RAISED BY PETITIONERS WERE NOT PRESERVED IN THE DISTRICT COURT IS

CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY T O THE RECORD.

The Court of Appeals' Decision was apparently based, at least in part, on the conclusion that
petitioners' did not preserve the constitutional issues raised in their appeal in the district court. Such
conclusion is clearly erroneous. On the contrary, set forth in the Brief of the Appellants, Statement
of Facts at flj 11, 18, 25, 26, 30, 31, 34-36, 41, 42, and in the Reply Brief of the Appellants at pp. 3,
4, and 14, the constitutional issues were expressly raised in connection with petitioners' motion for
protective order and petitioners' motion for sanctions.
Petitioners recognize that, as the Court of Appeals states in note 1 of its Decision, petitioners
inadvertently failed to cite to the record in the Statement of the Issues portion of the Brief of the
Appellants. However, the Court of Appeals itself has previously recognized that a technical violation
of Rule 24, Utah R. App. P. is not, in and of itself, grounds for refusal to address issues on appeal
which have been preserved in the court below. See, e.g., Rosendahl v. Rosendahl, 876 P.2d 870, 876
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(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (court refused to stnke a party's appeal bnef which failed to comply with Utah
Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a), and reached the merits of the appeal).6
E.

T H E COURT O F APPEALS' DECISION FAILS T O ADDRESS PETITIONERS'
APPEAL O F THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER DENYING SANCTIONS UNDER
RULE 45, UTAH R. CIV. P.

The Court of Appeals' Decision focuses exclusively on petitioners' appeal of the distnct
court's order denying sanctions under Rule 11. However, petitioners' appeal was not limited to
appealing from the district court's denial of Rule 11 sanctions. Rather, petitioners also appealed the
district's court's failure to determine whether Defendant violated Rule 45, Utah R. Civ P., and
appealed the distnct court's order denying sanctions under Rule 45(c)(1), Utah R. Civ. P.7
The Court of Appeals' failure to address this aspect of the appeal is crucial inasmuch as the
constitutional arguments raised by petitioners relate directly to Rule 45.s As set discussed more fully

furthermore, as set forth above, specific citations to the record with respect to the constitutional issues and
whether the subpoenas were void appear throughout petitioners' appeal briefs Furthermore, the relevant motions
and memoranda wherein the issues were raised were attached as Exhibits 10, 11 and 12 to the Addendum to the
Bnef of the Appellants ("Appellants' Addendum") Additionally, the transcripts of the 16 May 1996 hearing and the
23 August 1996 hearing wherein the issues were discussed were provided to the Court of Appeals as Exhibits 13
and 14 to Appellants' Addendum Moreover, in its Decision, this Court of Appeals expressly acknowledges having
reviewed the transcripts of the hearings and, therefore, the Court of Appeals had its own independent knowledge of
the fact that these issues were raised and preserved in the district court Given such facts, the Court of Appeals'
failure to reach the merits of petitioners' appeal based upon petitioners' failure to strictly comply with the
requirements or Rule 24(a)(5)(A), Utah R App P would be to elevate form over substance, a practice which is not
condoned by this Court See, e g, Buzas Baseball Inc v Salt Lake Trappers, Inc , 952 P 2d 941, 947, n 4 (Utah
1996) ("[w]hile Buzas Baseball brought this action by filing a verified complaint rather than a motion, as
contemplated by the statutes, requiring the trial court to grant a motion to dismiss on that basis would elevate form
over substance ")
Additionally, m its Decision, the Court of Appeals cites to Trimball Real Estate v Monte Vista Ranch Inc
758 P 2d 451, 455 (Utah Ct App 1988) for the proposition that it is proper to decline on appeal to address
unpreserved arguments Appellants do not contest this well-accepted principal However, Trimball Real Estate
simply is not applicable to this appeal, where it is clear that all of the arguments raised on this appeal were in fact
preserved m the trial court below
7

These issues were specifically identified in the Docketing Statement filed with the Court of Appeals, and
were argued m the Brief of the Appellants and Reply Brief of Appellants filed with the Court of Appeals
8

In its Decision, the Court of Appeals declined to address the constitutional issues raised by petitioners, in
part, because the Court of Appeals asserted that "appellants have failed to present adequate legal argument and
analvsis sufficient to assist us in understanding how these issues relate m any relevant way to the denial of Rule 11
sanctions appealed " Court of Appeals' Decision, n 1 Contrary to the Court of Appeals' apparent
(continued )
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below, Rule 45, combined with the Utah Constitution, require a party to litigation to give prior notice
to a non-party of its efforts to obtain that non-party's confidential financial information. Additionally,
Rule 45 and the Utah Constitution require that a subpoena be signed by an attorney (not his secretary
as was done here), that the requisite Notice to Persons Served with a Subpoena be attached to the
subpoena (which was not done here), that the person commanded to produce documents have at least
14 days within which to comply with the subpoena (which was not done here), and that the attorney
serving the subpoena take steps to insure that the person served with the subpoena not be subject to
under burden or expense (which was not done here). Failure to comply with these obligations subjects
the violating attorney to "an appropriate sanction, which may include, but is not limited to, lost
earnings and a reasonable attorney's fees." Utah R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1). Thus, the constitutional issues,
the validity of the subpoenas and counsel's conduct in allowing a secretary to sign pleadings on his
behalf is relevant to whether the Defendant violated Rule 45, Utah R. Civ. P., and to whether
Petitioners are entitled to recover their costs, expenses and attorneys' fees under Rule 45.
F.

THE COURT O F APPEALS MISAPPREHENDED THE MANNER IN WHICH PETITIONERS'
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS RELATE T O THE APPEAL.

The Court of Appeals states that petitioners failed to adequately explain how the constitutional
issues raised in the appeal relate to the denial of Rule 11 sanctions. Court of Appeals Decision, n. 1,
Exhibit 1 to the Appendix.

In making this determination, the Court of Appeals apparently

misapprehended the relationship of the constitutional issues to the appeal. Whether the Defendant
violated petitioners' constitutional rights by serving subpoenas which had been unlawfully signed by
a secretary and which did not comply with other requirements of Rule 45, Utah R. Civ. P., whether
the Defendant failed to give petitioners' prior notice of the Bank One subpoena, as mandated by Rule
8

(...continued)
misapprehension, however, petitioners do not assert that the constitutional issues necessarily relate to the denial of
sanctions under Rule 11. Rather, the constitutional issues relate directly to the denial of sanctions under Rule 45.
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45 and the Utah Constitution, and whether the Defendant served a subpoena on Bank One that did not
comport with the requirements of Rule 45, Utah R. Civ. P., relates directly to whether the Defendant
violated Rule 11, and whether sanctions should be imposed under Rule 11. If the conduct engaged
in by Mr. Olsen is determined to have violated Rule 11, then an appropriate sanction is mandatory.
Taylor, 770 P.2d at 171 ("[i]f a Rule 11 violation is shown, an appropriate sanction is mandated").
The constitutional issues also relate directly to petitioners' motion for sanctions under Rule
45, Utah R. Civ. P., an aspect of the appeal which the Court of Appeals' Decision fails to address.
See supra for a discussion of this point.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS CERTIORARI DISCRETION TO ADDRESS
AND RESOLVE THE IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED IN
PETITIONERS' APPEAL.
The Court of Appeals expressly recognized that petitioners' appeals presents "a number of

interesting and serious constitutional arguments . . ." Court of Appeals' Decision, n. 1. This Court
should exercise its certiorari discretion to address and resolve these important issues, which are ones
which face virtually every trial lawyer in the state of Utah. These specific issues, and a brief
discussion relating to these issues, are set forth below.
A.

GIVEN THIS COURT'S PRIOR RULING THAT A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
PRIVACY EXISTS WITH RESPECT TO ONE'S FINANCIAL AND BANKING
RECORDS, IS A LITIGANT REQUIRED TO PROVIDE PRIOR NOTICE TO A NONPARTY THAT THE LITIGANT IS SUBPOENAING THE
CONFIDENTIAL FINANCIAL INFORMATION FROM THE
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION?

NON-PARTY'S
NON-PARTY'S

This Court has previously held that persons are constitutionally protected "against
unreasonable searches and seizures of their bank statements, checks, bonds, loan applications, loan
guarantees, and all papers which [they] supplied to the bank to facilitate the conduct of [their]
financial affairs upon a reasonable assumption that the information would remain confidential." State
v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991). Given this constitutional right of privacy, one of the
16

questions which petitioners ask this Court to address and resolve is whether a litigant is required to
provide a non-party prior notice of the litigant's attempts to subpoena or otherwise obtain confidential
financial information from the non-party's financial institution.9
Petitioners believe that the answer to this question must be a resounding yes. Given this
Court's determination that persons have a constitutional right of privacy in their banking records, the
only way that right can be protected is if the person is provided prior notice of a litigant's attempts to
obtain the person's private banking information, so as to afford the affected person an opportunity to
object to the subpoena or otherwise obtain a protective order to protect the confidentiality of the
information which is being sought. The importance of such a prior notice requirement is keenly
demonstrated by the facts of this case.
Here, the Defendant failed to provide petitioners with any notice whatsoever of Mr. Olsen's
subpoenas to banks for PCP's banking record. Yet Rule 45 clearly requires the subpoenaing party to
provide "prior notice" of any commanded production or inspection of documents. Utah R. Civ. P.
45(b)(1)(A). "The purpose of this notice to afford the other parties. . . the opportunity to object to the
production [of documents] or inspection [of premises] and was inserted into the rule to prevent ex
parte abusive and illegal use of the subpoena power. United States v. Santiago-Lugo, 904 F. Supp.
43, 47 (D.P. R. 1995). This "prior notice" requirement has constitutional underpinnings.
Although the right of privacy in banking records which this Court recognized in Thompson
arose in the context of a criminal case, other courts have recognized that person's constitutional right
of privacy extends to banking records subpoenaed in noncriminal matters. For example, the Utah
Court of Appeals has already recognized that, in the context of a government agency conducting an

Petitioners believe this prior notice requirement includes an obligation on a litigation to provide the
requisite Form 30 Notice to Persons Served With a Subpoena to a bank which is served with a subpoena, a
requirement which already is embodied in Rule 45, Utah R. Civ. P., but which was ignored by the Defendant and
her counsel throughout the proceedings in the district court.
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investigation in a civil matter, the agency can only obtain confidential financial information once it
has obtained a written order of the court, and only after it has given notice to the person whose
confidential bank records the agency is going to subpoena. See State v. Waite, 803 P.2d 1279, 1281
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (interpreting Utah's Financial Information Privacy Act, Utah Code Ann.§§ 7827-45 to 50.).10
The prior notice provisions in Rule 45, and the Form 30 Notice, if followed, assure that before
the execution of the subpoena the non-party will have an opportunity to (a) test the constitutional
validity of a subpoena concerning its banking records, (b) object to the scope of a subpoena
concerning their banking records, and (c) seek protection in the form of a protective order from
unrestricted public disclosure of their confidential banking records. Non-parties' constitutional rights

Other jurisdictions are in accord. For example, a person's constitutional right to notice prior to the
execution of a subpoena of their financial records was upheld by the Colorado Supreme Court when it stated:
under the Colorado Constitution a bank customer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
bank's records of the customer's financial transactions. As a result, those records are protected by
the Colorado Constitution against unreasonable searches and seizures. The core value to which
the constitulional protection is extended is the customer's privacy interest. In order to give effect
to that protection, the customer must have an opportunity to test the constitutional validity of
an administrative subpoena before it is executed.
People v Lamb, 732 P.2d 1216, 1220 (Colo. 1987) (emphasis added).
Similarly, when presented with a situation in a civil context where no prior notice of a subpoena for
confidential records had been given to the affected non-party, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York stated:
In this situation the court believes that fair play demands that formal notice in accordance with
the requirements of due process be served upon an owner of books and records by the person who
subpoenas a third party custodian to produce such books and records, before production is
required. Only in this manner may an owner have an opportunity to be heard in order to
protect his rights and interests which may extend far beyond the books and records themselves.
Alma - Schuhfabrik Ag vs. Rosenthal, 25 F.R.D. 100, 101 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (emphasis added).
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of privacy must not be subordinated to the litigants' zealous interests, at the discretion of the litigant's
attorney in violation of his or her fiduciary duty as an officer of the court.11
B.

T H E SECOND IMPORTANT POLICY ISSUE W H I C H THIS COURT SHOULD
ADDRESS IS WHETHER AN ATTORNEY MAY DELEGATE T O H I S OR H E R
SECRETARY THE AUTHORITY T O SIGN SUBPOENAS, DEPOSITION NOTICES
AND OTHER PAPERS T O B E FILED W I T H THE COURTS.

The second "interesting and important" public policy issue raised in connection with this
matter is whether an attorney may do that which was done by Mr. Olsen in the proceedings in the
district court — i.e, can an attorney delegate to his or her secretary the authority to sign subpoenas,
deposition notices and other papers to be filed with the courts. Petitioners respectfully submit that the
answer to this question must be a resounding no.
Even a casual reading of the applicable rules demonstrates that an attorney's secretary cannot
properly sign subpoenas, deposition notices or other papers to be filed with the courts. Under Rule
45(a)(3) only the Clerk of the Court, and "an attorney admitted to practice in the Court in which
the action is pending" may issue and sign subpoenas "as an officer of the court." (Emphasis added).
Historically, courts have carefully guarded the subpoena power. The change to allow attorneys to
directly and unilaterally issue subpoenas occurred only three years ago. Neither the Utah legislature
nor the Utah courts have shared the subpoena power with an attorney's non-licensed staff members.
Similarly, Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P., makes clear that a secretary cannot sign subpoenas,
deposition notices and other papers to be filed with the courts:

As noted by the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, "abuse of the subpoena
power is an actionable tort." Santiago-Lugo, 904 F. Supp. at 48. In addition, where the attorney acts as "an officer
of the court", Rule 45(c), Utah R. Civ. P., the attorney's failure to provide prior notice before a non-party's
confidential banking records are searched and seized would result in an unconstitutional depravation of the nonparty's civil rights, giving rise to a federal § 19893 claim. If the injured non-party cannot obtain relief from the
court which issued the subpoena, the only way the non-party will get relief is by pursuing such claims. This Court
should adopt and enforce policies and positions such as a prior notice requirement which will reduce, not enlarge
the civil litigation dockets, of Utah's district courts.
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Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name who is duly licensed
to practice in the state of Utah. . . . fSJignature of an attorney constitutes a
certification by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper, that to the
best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for an
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation (emphasis added).
Utah R. Civ. P.l 1 (emphasis added).
A secretary's signature does not fulfill the attorney's Rule 11 requirements. Rather, it short
circuits the certification mandate of Rule 11, and constitutes a misrepresentation to the Court, to
opposing counsel, and to the non-parties served or affected that the subpoenas, deposition notices and
other papers have been signed by the attorney. It is a practice that should not be condoned, and this
Court should exercise its discretion in this matter to declare definitively to the members of the Bar that
they may not engage in such practices.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should exercise its discretion to review the Decision
of the Court of Appeals. Furthermore, even if this Court were to determine that the district court's
and Court of Appeals' denial of sanctions under Rules 11 and 45 is proper, this Court should exercise
its discretion to address and resolve the important constitutional and public policy issues presented.
it/'
da;
Dated this£/j_
day of February, 1998.

FOSTER& FOSTER L.C.

By:
Lynn G. Foster
Brett L. Foster
Ronald F. Price
Attorneys for Petitioners
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Mitch Olsen
OLSEN & OLSEN
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Before Judges Wilkins, Billings, and Jackson.
WILKINS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Appellants challenge the trial court's decision, denying
their motion for costs and attorney fees under Rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. When reviewing a trial court's
rule 11 determination, we review the trial court's conclusion
that rule 11 was or was not violated under a correction of error
standard and the trial court's determination of • the type and
amount of sanction under an abuse of discretion standard. See
Barnard v. Sutliff. 846 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah 1992); SchQney V,
Memorial Estates. Inc.. 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
First, we note, the transcript of the August 23, 1996
hearing held on appellants' motion for sanctions and attorney
fees as well as the May 16, 1996 hearing transcript adequately
represent the factual findings made by the trial court to allow
our review of the court's decision to deny appellants's motion
for sanctions and attorney fees, reflected in the October 15,
1996 order.

Having reviewed the transcript and order, and the scant
legal argument appellants direct to the issue subject to review,1
we conclude that the trial court did not err. "Rule 11 'Ives
trial courts great leeway to tailor the sanction to fit Lne
requirements of the particular case." See Taylor v. Estate of
Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In this case,
the trial court was clearly of the mind that the parties to this
appeal each had created considerable difficulties in the
discovery process and that as such neither was entitled to
sanctions or attorney fees against the other.
Affirmed.

Michael J. Wilkins,
Associate Presiding Judge

WE CONCUR:

1. Although appellants' present in their brief a number of
interesting and serious constitutional arguments, they fail to
indicate where these issues appear in the record as presented to
the trial court: as required by Rule 25(a) (5) (A), of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Trimble Real Est^tf* v. Monte
Vista Ranch. Inc. . 758 P.2d 451, 455 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
(declining on appeal to address unpreserved argument). In
addition, appellants have failed to present adequate legal
argument and analysis sufficient to assist us in understanding
how these issues relate in any relevant way to the denial of Rule
11 sanctions appealed. As a result, we decline to address them.
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Clifford E. Holt,
Plaintiff,
v.
Audrey N. Holt,
Defendant.

ORDER
Case No. 960732-CA

Terrance E. Frank; and
Park City Pharmacy, Inc.,
Third-party Appellants,
v,
Audrey N. Holt,
Appellee.

This matter is before the court upon appellant's petition
for rehearing, filed December 26, 1997.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is
denied.
Dated this

\" day of January, 1991

FOR THE COURT:

Normarf'H. Jackson, #udge
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CLIFFORD HOLT,
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Plaintiff,

No.

954300067
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COURT PROCEEDINGS

AUDREY HOLT,
Defendant.
*

*

*

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Coalville, Utah
May 16, 1996

BRAD J . YOUNG
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

Brian

1

THE COURT:

I want to have Counsel tell the Court, in

2

a very definitive manner, what it is you want in the discovery

3

process, and what evidence you have to present to the Court to

4

authorize you to continue to pursue it.

Go ahead.

5

MR. OLSEN:

Can I do that?

6

THE COURT:

Yes.

7

MR. OLSEN:

If I might just speak one minute to what

8

Miss Saunders has indicated.

This started clear back with

9

Judge Noel, your Honor, we came before the Court, and they

10

provided all this horrendous evidence that Mr. Holt was making

11

some $4,000 a month.

12

that indicated that he did not.

13

paid my client, alone, just moneys to her, over $87,000.

14

can't do that on $4,000 a month.

15

And I was grateful.

16

And we provided all kinds of evidence
For instance, during 1994, he
You

It is physically impossible.

But Mr. Holt finally admitted in his deposition in

17

1994, and this is completely different than what he has

18

indicated throughout the discovery process, but he finally

19

admitted in his deposition that he made $100,000 in 1994.

So

20 J it has taken us that long to finally get to someplace.
21

But the problem is this.

And Mr. Foster is here to

22

address it.

You hear this all the time, but I will just tell

23

you why I need this information.

24

an opportunity to review all the mountains of things I have

25

presented and what Mr. Foster has presented.

I am sure the Court has had

I am just very

surprised.

I requested something that was, in my opinion,

very, very simple, your Honor.

I asked that Mr. Frank —

I

asked that he provide copies of checks given by Mr. Frank, who
Mr. Holt believes —

at least alleges that is his boss, the

checks that were given by Mr. Frank to the defendant.
Now, in his interrogatories, he alleges that
Mr. Frank loaned him some $65,000 in 1994.
is income.

Well, we believe i

All we want to do is see the checks that have been

given by Mr. Frank to Mr. Holt.

I think that's discoverable.

How in the world can it not be?
THE COURT:

Why isn't the defendant forthcoming, or

the plaintiff forthcoming with that information?
MR. OLSEN:

He doesn't have it.

MS. SAUNDERS:
MR. OLSEN:

We don't have it.

The checks are with Mr. Frank.

have paid the checks to Mr. Holt.
returned to Mr. Frank.

He would

The checks would have been

The issue here, your Honor, is income.

That's it.
THE COURT:
MR. FOSTER:
THE COURT:
MR. FOSTER:

Let's ask Counsel where the checks are.
Would you like me to speak to that?
Yes.
The Court is trying to rein this case

in, instead of let it just get out of hand.
MR. FOSTER:

We don't have any problem, your Honor,

at all, with abiding by the Rules of Civil Procedure, in

3

1

providing appropriate documents.

2

A, is an exaggeration, at best, and something much worse than

3

that, at worst.

4

documents.

5

representative capacity, the documents of Park City Pharmacy.

6

We didn't object to providing the documents, per se.

7

objected if they were not relevant, and we laid claim to bank

8

records being confidential,

9

What Mr, Olsen has to say is,

He didn't ask Mr. Frank for Mr. Frank's

He asked Mr, Frank personally, and not in a

We

I spoke with this man, and asked him if he would like

10

to propose a stipulated protective order, to which he did not

11

have time to devote attention.

12

records available and have him expose them in a deposition.

13

When I talked with him on the phone, he had already subpoenaed

14

Park City Pharmacy, Inch's records.

15

Pharmacy,

16

certificates subject to signature by the people.

17

counsel of record.

We don't have to make those

I formed the company.

I represent Park City

I issued the stock
I am still

And Terry Frank is the registered agent for

18 J service of process for that company, and has seen no corporate
19 I subpoena or copy of any subpoena.
20

These people do a submarine subpoena.

By that I mean

21

they did not serve Park City Pharmacy with a copy, and they go

22

directly to Park City Pharmacy's bank records in Bank One, get

23

those records, and after we have filed our motion for

24 J protective order to preserve the confidentiality of these
25

documents, and I am speaking with this man, he does not tell me

4

1

that he has possession of Park City Pharmacy records,

2

concerning which I have asserted a claim of confidentiality.

3

But, rather, he takes Mr. Holt's deposition, and exposes those

4

documents as exhibits on a nonconfidential basis, and then I

5

learn about it after the deposition, that our documents have

6

been obtained without our knowledge, from our bank, and no

7

effort has been made to put them under seal, to advise me, so

8

that I can come to this Court and say, your Honor, we have an

9 I objection to these being provided.
10

if they are relevant.

11

relevant.

12

We want a protective order,

We want them excluded, if they are not

It seems to me reasonable.
THE COURT:

And the Court thinks that's reasonable,

13

also.

14

issued to the plaintiff in this case, and all the rest of the

15

bank records, let's seal them, until the Court determines that

16

they should be unsealed.

17 I

Why don't we just provide copies of any checks that were

MR. FOSTER:

We don't have possession of the bank

18

records that had been subpoenaed.

Counsel, Mr. Olsen, counsel

19

for the defendant, has those records.

He has refused to give

20 J me copies of the records he got from Bank One, and he has
21

refused to give me a copy of the subpoena that he gave to Bank

22

One, which I find very curious.

23 J
24

We think, also, there is a serious issue of
invalidity on the subpoenas.

They were signed by a secretary.

25 I She is not an officer of the court.

We see that as a forgery.

5

1

We think the burden is on Mr. Olsen to sign his own subpoenas.

2

We think if the secretary signs the subpoenas, they are of no

3

force and effect.

4

concerning subpoenas that really, in effect, don't exist.

5
6

Therefore, we think we are before this Court

THE COURT:

Help the Court cut to the chase on this

one.

7

MR. FOSTER:

If the Court will tell me —

if the

8

Court v/ill give me an attorney eyes only protective order, and

9

will confine what we are to produce to precisely that —

what

10

he asked for in the subpoena to Terry Frank was all of the bank

11

statements, all of the checks for four years.

12

MR. OLSEN:

13

MR. FOSTER:

14

MR. OLSEN:

15

MR. FOSTER:

16

I haven't asked that from Terry Frank.
Would you like me to get it out?
That's fine, yeah.
I would be very pleased to pull the

subpoena.

17

MR. OLSEN:

18

MR. FOSTER:

19

MR. OLSEN:

To Bank One or to Terry Frank?
To Terry Frank.
I correct myself.

One of the main issues

20

here is the American Express account that Mr. Holt claims is

21

being paid by Park City Pharmacy.

22

of the checks paid on the American Express account from Park

23

City Pharmacy for '93, '94 and '95.

24

are using this American Express account as income.

25

$35,000 on his American Express account, and he alleges that's

All I asked for was copies

What's happening is they
He charged

1 I not income.
2

But he is using it for personal purposes.

They

are not business purposes.

3

MR. FOSTER:

We have to get back to the issue of

4

running roughshod over the Rules of Civil Procedure and case

5

law in trying to get to these records.

6

Civil Procedure and a great deal of the case law we have cited

7

to the Court has to do with protection of the rights of third

8

parties.

Part of the Rules of

Terry Frank is not a party to this.

9 J in all due respect, what these records are,
I am not trying to conceal anything.

I have no idea,
I have never seen

10

them.

11

cases all over this land, and I have never seen anybody not

12

appropriately serve copies of subpoenas, not honor a motion for

13

a protective order, and file a motion for attorney's fees, and

14

file a motion to compel.

15
16

THE COURT:
position.

17
18
19

But I have tried

Just mind-boggling.

The Court is going to honor your

Here is what the Court would like to do.
MR. FOSTER:

We will accommodate, reasonably, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Maybe it just is going to fall on deaf

20

ears again.

21

domestic case that is generating a small forest of paper.

22

Every time the parties come to court, every time they file a

23

motion, every time they respond to a motion, money for this

24

little family is going someplace else.

25

We have what appears to be a fairly routine

MR. FOSTER:

Mr. Terry Frank1s money.

He is into it

7

1 I four or five grand.
2

THE COURT:

I just simply would appreciate it if

3

counsel would help the Court to help you focus on the issues of

4

this case, and unl ess it is different than hundreds of cases

5

that this Court sees every year, that deal with questions of

6

custody and visitation and support and fair division of assets

7

and fair assumption of debt, I mean, there can only be so many

8

twists and turns to this type of lawsuit.

9

resolved.

Let's get it

I am asking counsel, as a courtesy to each other,

10

and as an act of deference to the Court, to seal the records

11

that are questionable in any way as having any bearing in this

12

lawsuit.

13

the records surrendered to the Court, and they will be under a

14

protective order.s The Court believes that if the request is as

15

it has been articulated, counsel should be entitled to receive

16

copies of any checks from the plaintiff's employer to the

17

plaintiff in a relevant period of time.

18

We will give you the protective order.

MR. FOSTER:

And I want

May I point out to the Court that the

19 J subpoena to Bank One reads as follows.

"All copies of

20

statements and checks on account number such and such, Park

21

City Pharmacy, for 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996. "

22

has the records.

23

MR. OLSEN:

24

MR. FOSTER:

25

So he already

These are from him, personally.
Are we orally modifying the subpoena to

Terry Frank to his records, only, now?

8

1

MR. OLSEN:

It says from Terry Frank, copies of all

2

checks given by you, Terry Frank, to Clifford Holt.

3

is saying that Terry Frank has loaned him money.

4

is copies of those checks from Mr. Frank to Mr. Holt.

5

MR. FOSTER:

I need clarification.

Mr. Holt

All we want

Because your

6

subpoena reads copies of all checks given by you or entities in

7

which you have an interest.

8

MR. OLSEN:

Are you striking

—

I have Park City Pharmacy.

If there is

9 I other entities, yes.
10

MR. FOSTER:

What's the scope?

A minute ago you are

11

telling me all you want are Terry Frank 1 s records.

12

seem to be saying you want his records and Park City Pharmacy

13

records.

Now you

14

MR. OLSEN:

15

MR. FOSTER:

16

MR. OLSEN:

17

MR. FOSTER:

18

MR. OLSEN:

You don't have to duplicate that.

19

MR. FOSTER:

You are going to strike in your

20

subpoena —

21

other

Any check he has signed to Cliff Holt.
Do you not have the bank records?
I do.
Why do we have to duplicate that?

okay, Park City Pharmacy.

financial

You do have records from

institutions.

22

MR. OLSEN:

23

MR. FOSTER:

Do not.

That's not consistent with my

24

understanding, that there was a subpoena not only to Park City

25

Pharmacy but to one other -- one other entity.

Some savings

9

1

savings and loan; is that correct?

2

MR. OLSEN:

I don f t know what you are speaking of.

3

just want checks from Mr. Frank to Mr. Holt.

4

check that he has signed.

5

MR. FOSTER:

That's all.

I

Any

So what you want from me, then, to make

6

sure that I understand what's being sought, is any nonPark City

7

Pharmacy check which has been signed by Terry Frank and is

8

available to Cliff Holt.

9

MR. OLSEN:

Sure.

That's all I want.

10

THE COURT:

Can you live with that?

11

MR. FOSTER:

I can live with it.

But we request,

12

your Honor, that we be awarded our attorney's fees for having

13

to deal with this.

14

available.

This is not our problem.

All this man had to do was behave reasonably, and

15 J we would have cooperated.
16

MR. OLSEN:

We are in litigation all the time.

I will address that.

17

things that I have requested, also.

18

Mr. Frank loaned him money.

19

I want is a copy of those promissory notes.

20

fair and reasonable.

21

MR. FOSTER:

22 I would like —

Self help was

But there are other

He is saying that

If there are promissory notes, all
I think that's

I don't want to get into duplication.

first of all, I would like to have a copy of all

23

the bank records that you subpoenaed.

And I would like you to

24

send me a copy of the subpoena, too, that you have refused to

25

send me up to this point.

If you have already got promissory

10

I

1

notes, I don't want to be searching for the ones you already

2

have.

3

MR. 0LSEN:

I don f t have any.

4

MR. FOSTER:

If they exist.

5

MR. OLSEN:

6

Can I have those?

If they don't exist, just tell me they

don't exist.

7

THE COURT:

Anything else?

8

MR. OLSEN:

Copies of checks that have been paid by

9
10

Mr. Frank or entities in which he has an interest to American
Express.

11
12

MR. FOSTER:
think that's

I think we would object to that.

I

—

13

MR. OLSEN:

On Mr. Holt's account.

14

MR. FOSTER:

Well beyond the scope of what's

16

THE COURT:

He said only as it related to the

17

plaintiff, not to that account.

18

plaintiff.

15 I relevant.

19 J

Only as it related to the

The Court believes that's a reasonable request.
MR. OLSEN:

The documents indicate, your Honor, that

20

Mr. Holt is the owner of a membership at Jeremy Ranch Country

21

Club and Golf Course.

22

owns the membership.

23

a document that indicates that Park City Pharmacy owns that

24

club membership.

25

MR. FOSTER:

He is claiming that Park City Pharmacy
All I have asked Mr. Frank is to show me

Why doesn't he go to the club?

11

1
2

MR. OLSEN:

I have been there.

They say Mr. Holt

owns i t.

3

MR. FOSTER:

4

MR. OLSEN:

That's the case, so be it.

5

THE COURT:

It is denied.

6

The Court will not require

the production of that evidence.

7
8

Then you have your evidence.

MR. OLSEN:

Any partnership agreement between

Mr. Holt and Mr. Frank.

9

MR. FOSTER:

There are no partnership agreements.

10 J One share of stock that's been issued, and that was issued to
11

Terry Frank.

That's the only outstanding item.

12

MR. OLSEN:

13

MR. FOSTER:

14

MR. OLSEN:

15

Not to my knowledge.
I have asked for a copy of benefits

provided by Park City Pharmacy to Cliff Holt.

16
17

Employment agreements with Mr. Frank.

MR. FOSTER:

It is unlikely.

informal kind of thing.

18

MR. OLSEN:

19

no.

20

right?

There aren't any, all you have to say is

But if you do have them, you will give them to me; is that

21

MR. FOSTER:

22

MR. OLSEN:

Sure.
And, your Honor, I have the rest of the

23

documents from other sources.

24

I am speaking from Mr. Frank.

25

This is a fairly

MR. FOSTER:

So those are the only ones that

We would like copies of those documents

12

to the extent they involve any —

Terry Frank in any way.

if

they have gone on a submarine subpoena, and they have popped
these things out here, we haven1t been notified.
know what they are.

We want to

We may want to file an after-the-fact

protective order.
THE COURT:

Your request is ordered.

The Court

orders all those documents be duplicated and provided to
counsel for the pharmacy by June 1.
MS. SAUNDERS:

May I also get copies of the checks

that will be provided?

I don't have them.

I didn't want them

until this was resolved.
MR. FOSTER:

I will see the plaintiff gets copies.

MS. SAUNDERS:

The ones that Mr. Olsen has in his

possession.
MR. OLSEN:

There are a lot of checks.

ordered me to deliver those to the Court.
to the Court.

The Court has

I will provide those

If they want to take them from the Court

MR. FOSTER:

I don't want to make another trip up

here to try to find out document
MR. OLSEN:

—

All I have is the checks.

they be sealed and delivered to the Court.
MR. FOSTER:

—

You ordered

I will do that.

I would like all the documents that he

has that relate to Terry Frank.
THE COURT:

That's reasonable.

The Court has so

ordered.

13

1

MR- OLSEN:

I will make them available for him to

3

THE COURT:

Send them to him.

4

MR. OLSEN:

There are thousands.

2

copy.

5

of all those.

6

copies.

I will make them available for him to make

7

MR. FOSTER:

8

MR. OLSEN:

9

I think you can.
Is the Court ordering I make copies, or

make them available for him to make copies?

10

MR. POSTER:

11

MR. OLSEN:

12

I think he ordered you to make copies.
It cost me hundreds of dollars to make

copies of those checks.

13

THE COURT:

You take all of the copies to a date and

14

a time and a place certain.

15

document.

16
17

MR. OLSEN:

19

Anything else?

20

MR. FOSTER:

23

I

have no problem with that.
THE COURT:

22

Counsel can come and look at every

Make copies of anything they want.

18

21

I can't make copies

I want that done before June 1.

Just would like the Court to grant our

attorney's fees.
THE COURT:

On your request for fees, Counsel, reduce

the claim for fees to an affidavit.

24

MR. FOSTER:

25

THE COURT:

It is of record.
You have submitted an affidavit?

14

1

MR. POSTER:

Yes.

2

THE COURT:

You responded to it?

3

MR. OLSEN:

I have.

If I might speak to that.

4

Counsel would lead the Court to believe that he was submarined.

5

I might indicate, and I have put in my response, your Honor, we

6

have documents that would indicate that Mr. Holt is the owner

7

of Park City Pharmacy.

8 I indicated that —
9

As a result of those documents that

and signed by him, written by him, that he is

the owner of Park City Pharmacy, what we did is on March 11 of

10 J 1996 copies of my subpoenas were delivered to opposing counsel.
11

There was absolutely no objection that was filed on the Bank

12

One subpoena.

13

Mr. Foster enters his appearance on March 28, three weeks after

14

my subpoena went out to Mr. Holt.

15 J

That subpoena went out to Bank One on March 11.

Now, if Mr. Holt had a problem with my subpoena he

16 I could have objected to that subpoena.

It went out to Bank One.

17

I received the document before Mr. Foster even came into this

18

litigation.

19

is I had documents that indicated Mr. Holt was the owner of

I didn't even know who Mr. Foster was.

20 J Park City Pharmacy.

I provided those to the Court.

I sent out

21

that subpoena.

22

Mr. Foster enters his appearance, subsequent to my subpoena

23

being sent out and the document being received from Bank One.

24
25

Those documents came from Bank One.

All I knew

Then

Now, the problem is, your Honor, I sent and have
served upon Mr. Frank a subpoena duces tecum and also a

15

1

subpoena for a deposition.

2

spoke with me, and I did speak with Mr. Foster.

3

indicated to me that Mr. Frank would absolutely not provide me

4

my documents and would not show up at his deposition.

5

your Honor, I had subpoenaed four individuals for depositions,

6

and all four of those individuals just failed to show up.

7

he is requesting, your Honor, attorney's fees.

8

have from Mr. Foster.

9

this Court are about $900.

10

Now, Mr. Foster indicates that he
Mr. Foster

In fact,

Now

This is what I

My total fees that I have requested from

Now, Counsel would lead this Court to believe that my

11

fees are inflated.

Mr. Foster just stood and said his fees

12

were $4,000.

13

requested.

14

serve the registered agent.

The Court has reviewed what my subpoena
He said that I didn't do it right, because I didn f t
In Mr. Frank ! s affidavit, himself,

15 J he doesn't indicate that Park City Pharmacy is a corporation.
16

He says it is sole owner of Park City Pharmacy.

That's in his

17

affidavit.

18

served him the subpoena, requested the documents, in fact, had

19

to do it twice.

That's why the subpoena went to Mr. Frank.

My subpoena goes out early February.

I

They

20 I can't find Mr. Frank for over a month.

March 5, my subpoena

21

again.

comes back.

22

Then

I h a v e to send it o u t

Your H o n o r , w h a t I h a v e d o n e is n o t h i n g m o r e

than

23

what any other attorney would have done to try to protect Miss

24

Holt.

25

I tried to get it through him, couldn't.

The allegations were that he owned Park City Pharmacy.
Went to Bank One.

16

My

1

Bank One subpoena was a good subpoena.

2

with my subpoena.

3

THE COURT:

There was nothing wrong

The Court is going to take the question

4

of fees —

5

litigation has been resolved to deal with the questions of fees

6

and costs.

7
8

I intend to wait until after the underlying

MR. FOSTER:

In response to the belated attempt to

validate the subpoena to Bank One, I point out to the Court

9 J that good protocol and reason is to make known to the
10 J registered agent.

Now, we do this all the time.

Mr. Olsen

11

knows the procedure.

You pick up the phone, you call the

12

corporations division, you say, "What information do you have

13

in your files for Park City Pharmacy, Inc.?"

"Inc." suggests

14 J to any experienced lawyer that somewhere along the line there
15

is a corporation.

16

with a 60-second phone call, known that Terry Prank was the

17

agent for service of process, and the appropriate person to be

18

served for the corporation.

19

Had he done that, he would have immediately,

So he didn't do what any reasonable lawyer would do.

20

He short-cutted it.

His secretary signed the subpoenas, didn't

21

make a due diligence investigation, and then tries to stick us

22

with all of this work, and it is substantial, your Honor.

23

it is, to some extent, a matter of principle.

24

Mr. Olsen was that until we had resolved the issue of

25

confidentiality and relevance raised by our motions to quash

But

What I told

17

1

and for protective order, we would not produce documents, and

2

we would not permit Mr. Frank to be deposed, which is the

3

ordinary course of business in this kind of thing.

4

Mr. Olsen would like to make much about his February

5

subpoena.

If the Court will look at it, the Court will find

6

that it has the wrong address on it.

7

They started over with another one in March, with the right

8

address, and within a couple of weeks, two and a half weeks, it

9

was served.

So it was discarded.

I have gone over to the apothecary shop which is

10

on South Temple, 10th East, hundreds of times.

11

the time I walk in there, Mr. Frank is behind the counter.

12

is not hiding.

13

around.

14

days, and he is there, and there is no affidavit from his

15

process server as to how many times he went or what he tried to

16

do to serve Mr. Frank.

17

vacation.

18

He doesn't have an office.

80 percent of
He

He doesn't sneak

All you have to do is walk in there, eight out of ten

There is a note saying Mr. Frank was on

So I would submit that the subpoena process used by

19

Defendant's counsel falls well short of normal protocol and

20

normal rules.

21

recent citation, holds lawyers to very strict behavior in terms

22

of how they proceed, when they exercise the subpoena power

23

within their own offices, as opposed to the old way, of

24

clerk-only subpoenas, your Honor.

25

And the case law, concerning which we have

THE COURT:

The record will reflect your position.

18

1

The Court is going to take the question of fees and costs under

2

advisement, and we will deal with it after the other issues

3

have been resolved in the case.

4

MR. 0LSEN:

5

For the record, I will have those

documents available May 28, at 2:00, at my office, for them.

6

MR. FOSTER:

7

Court's order.

8

give them to us?

9

I didn't understand that to be the

Didn't the Court order him to make a copy and

THE COURT:

The Court ordered that he notify Counsel

10 J where those documents were going to be available, and you can
11

pick and choose whatever you want from them.

12
13

MR. FOSTER:

We are to go to his office and examine

them?

14

MR. OLSEN:

Or someplace that's convenient.

But I

15

want everybody to know when and where that's going to occur.

16

Is the date agreeable with everyone?

17

MR. FOSTER:

18

MS. SAUNDERS:

19
20

I don't have my calendar with me.
I am going to be in San Francisco on

the 28th.
THE COURT:

Step outside when we are through, and the

21 I three of you agree on a date, time and place for the documents
22

to be inspected and/or copied, and include that in the order

23

that reflects the ruling of the Court today.

24

the plaintiff will prepare the —

25

will prepare the order.

And counsel for

counsel for the defendant

19

1

Now, let me say one more time, out of an effort, a

2

just compelling effort to get this case resolved, it does

3

nothing except generate tremendous fees and costs in this

4

lawsuit for people on both sides of this dispute to play the

5

lawsuit close to the vest.

6

this lawsuit,

7

on what the historical income of these people were while they

8 J lived together.

Income is a critical question in

I want the parties to be candid with each other

I mean, it is simply not a case of having to

9 J reinvent the wheel.

And if there are efforts to the contrary,

10 J I want the parties to cease and desist.

Let f s just get on with

11 I the question of what is going to be a fair award of child
12

support, based on historical income of these parties, what is

13

going to be a fair award of any other type of family or spousal

14

support, based on the income of these parties.

15 J
16

I understand that the real thorny question is
resolved, is it not, custody and visitation?

17

MR. OLSEN:

That is,

18 I

THE COURT:

It is a money case.

19 I the money resolving a money case.
20

MR. FOSTER:

21 I

THE COURT:

Let's not spend all

I am here to please.

Would you object if I were excused?
We are through.

22
23
24
25

20
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3

THE COURT:

Counsel will state an appearance.

4
5

Clifford Holt vs. Audrey Holt, 954300067.

MR. OLSEN:

Mitch Olsen appearing for and on behalf

of the defendant, Miss Holt.

6

MR. FOSTER:

My name is Lynn Foster.

I represent two

7

third parties, your Honor, Terrance Frank, also known as Terry

8

Frank; and Park City Pharmacy, a Utah corporation, doing

9

business in Park City.

10

THE COURT:

Tell the Court what stipulation you have

11

entered into thus far on the matters before the Court this

12

morning.

13

MR. FOSTER:

There was no stipulation, your Honor,

14

prior to the hearing.

15

matter, the Court, with the consent of counsel for the

16

defendant and counsel for the third parties, has adopted the

17

transcript of the hearing as the controlling order in this

18

matter; and, therefore, the Court will not be required to

19

decide as between the proposed order of the defendant and the

20

proposed order of the third parties.

At this hearing, as I understand the

21

THE COURT:

So stipulate?

22

MR. OLSEN:

So stipulate.

23

THE COURT:

That's the order of the Court.

24
25

What

other matters are pending?
MR. FOSTER:

There are three other matters.

One is a

1

fairly minor matter.

2

submission of an analysis of the transcript of the hearing,

3

which we got by facsimile the day before yesterday, and

4

yesterday in the mail.

5

had time to look at it.

6

neglect as to why —

7

weeks ago, that we should be bombarded at the last minute

8

forcing us to choose between preparation for the hearing and

9

reading of an additional memorandum.

10
11

That concerns Mr. Olsen's untimely

I have not looked at that.

I have not

And there is no showing of excusable

where he had possession of the transcript

Now, putting that to one side —

therefore, we

request the Court not consider that submission.

Putting that

12 I to one side, there is simply two issues remaining.

There is a

13

request by Mr. Olsen for hearings fees against the third-party

14

Frank, and there is a motion for sanctions by the third parties

15

against the defendant and defendant's counsel.

16

briefly argue that, if the Court will permit me to do so.

17

I don't think it will take a great length of time.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. FOSTER:

20

issue.

I would like to
And

You may proceed.
There are, essentially, two subpoenas at

May I approach the bench?

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. FOSTER:

You may.
The first subpoena in time is a records

23

deposition document, coupled, I think, with a subpoena duces

24

tecum.

25

Bank One, and it seeks "Any and all copies of statements and

That's the third and fourth page.

This is directed to

3

checks on account number such and such Park City Pharmacy for
1993, 1994 and 1995 and 1996. "

Now, that is sweeping, and

includes every document possessed by Bank One, which has -which concerns Park City Pharmacy, a Utah corporation, the
identification of which is readily available at the
corporations division in the State.
unduly broad.

You will note —

so that f s

It embraces far more material that's irrelevant

than it embraces relevant material.

The case law, which

clearly holds that, per se, bank records are confidential.

And

we have cited that to the Court.
The service, which was earlier argued by Mr. Olsen as
having been perfected on Mr. Holt, in a representative capacity
as an agent for Park City Pharmacy, was also a spurious
argument.

If you look at both certificates of service, they

were by mail, and they were to counsel for Mr. Holt, the
plaintiff, in his personal capacity.

There is no evidence that

there was ever any attempt to serve anyone in a representative
capacity for Park City Pharmacy.
The first we learned of this was after Mr. Holt's
deposition, but we had prior to that point in time received
notices of deposition and a subpoena to Mr. Frank personally,
and it was not a 30(b)6 type of procedure, where that he sought
Mr. Frank's records and any entity records in which Mr. Frank
holds an interest.
We believe —

going back to this records deposition,

4

1

we believe that all of the documents which Mr, Olsen

2

characterized as thousands at the last hearing, or next to last

3

hearing, ignoring the one that was in open court, as opposed to

4

the telephonic hearing, he had possession of those records, and

5

we never had notice,

6

We are here, your Honor, mostly, for the purpose of

7

preserving and protecting the rights of third parties in

8

litigation.

9

There were initial errors made on behalf of the defendant in

Our position is really a four-prong position.

10

clear and improper violation of the Utah Rules of Civil

11

Procedure to obtain these documents.

12

Pharmacy, my client, an opportunity to be heard, by the way it

13

was handled, in respect to whether we were going to produce

14

these records, and, if so, which part of them would be

15

relevant, and to have the opportunity to have them identified

16

as confidential documents.

17

They denied Park City

After we received Mr. Frank1s subpoenas, I filed a

18

motion for a protective order and to quash on the ground that

19

we thought what was being sought from Mr. Frank should not

20

include corporate records, should be limited to that which was

21

relevant, and, in any event, anything produced should be

22

produced under a secrecy order with the court.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. FOSTER:

25

How did the Court rule on that?
And the Court did not rule on that.

That was mooted, I think, your Honor, by reason of what

5

1

transpired before, in the hearing, because the Court said,

2

well, notwithstanding the flaws in respect to Mr. Frank's

3

notice of deposition and subpoena for documents, Mr, Foster,

4

will you, as a courtesy to the Court, do the following things?

5

And I said, yes, I will, your Honor.

6

the Court, by letter, and to Mr. Olsen the results of that.

7

think that could be construed as a consent, as opposed to an

8

order, but it doesn't make an awful lot of difference to me.

9

agreed to do it, and I did it.

And I reported both to

I think that mooted it.

I

I

There

10

was no offer made last time that Mr. Frank should sit for his

11

deposition.

12

And having filed the motion for protective order, we

13

should not concern ourselves, your Honor, with the request for

14

attorney's fees made by Mr. Olsen.

15

essentially, is that, notwithstanding the motion for protective

16

order, to quash, Mr. Frank should have shown up for his

17

deposition, he should have produced the documents, and, because

18

he didn't, the defendant should receive attorney's fees.

19

Anyone familiar with the elemental practice on deposition and

20

document discovery knows that a motion for protective order and

21

to quash stays the discovery and stays the deposition, pending

22

an order from the Court.

23

His contention,

And, furthermore, Mr. Olsen did not file a motion to

24

compel under Rule 37.

He just asked for attorney's fees.

We

25

think that's frivolous, and we should not have been bothered,

1

have to deal with that.

2

about the initial mistakes by Counsel, we are far more

3

concerned about the fact that there was a failure to cure, a

4

failure to mitigate.

5

get the subpoena directly from Mr. Olsen until about a week

6

ago, on the Bank One thing.

7

send it.

8
9

We are concerned, your Honor, not only

There was a dogged refusal.

I asked for it.

We couldn!t

He refused to

Finally, I got a copy from Evelyn Saunders.
subpoenaed —

Then I

or I asked for documents from Mr. Olsen, and

10

finally got the subpoena last week, and we went merrily

11

forward, offering no cooperation.

12

stipulate to a protective order, save the Court the time, and

13

present that to the Court?

14

it, because it was a divorce matter.

15

there, and doesn't tell us at this point in time he has got

16

thousands of documents already from Bank One, concerning which

17

Park City Pharmacy has never been served.

18

that the subpoena to Bank One was invalid on its face, void ab

19

initio, and he wrongfully is in possession.

20
21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT:

I said, why don't we

He didn't have time to deal with
So he leaves us out

We take the position

What would you like the Court to do this

morning?
MR. FOSTER:
transcript.

The Court already issued an order in the

The Court —

THE COURT:

let me

—

Specifically, what relief are you seeking

from the Court today?

7

1

MR, POSTER:

Compliance.

We have a man in contempt,

2

comes here and says maybe I thought I should bring the

3

documents.

4

lines 2, 9 and 11.

5

that are questionable."

6

now.

7

This is what the Court said.

Transcript, page 8,

"I am asking counsel to seal the records
Talking Park City pharmacy records

Then later, the Court, on page 8, lines 12 and 13, "I

8

want the records surrendered to the Court.11

9

surrendered them yet.

10

He hasn't

Our position is he shouldn't have them.

Then when we got downstream a ways, he said I want to

11

keep a copy, copy of wrongfully obtained documents that have

12

not been confidential.

13

he had possession of these documents, after he had used his

14

submarine subpoena, without proper service, he did not tell me

15

he had those documents.

16

of Mr. Holt, and used some of these Bank One documents as

17

exhibits in Mr. Holt's deposition, without ever telling us he

18

had them, and without marking them confidential, at a point in

19

time when we had filed our motion for protective order, saying

20

Park City Pharmacy and Mr. Frank are very concerned about

21

preserving the confidentiality of records.

22

Now, he and I spoke on the phone, when

He then went forward at the deposition

So we think -- we ordinarily would not be pursuing

23

this matter, your Honor.

Most lawyers that we would encounter,

24

once we pointed out the problem, would, number one, stipulate

25 I to a protective order, and it would be an easy thing, and it

1

would not burden the Court.

2

descent lawyers that I know would say, "I am sorry."

3

Apparently, in our haste, we overlooked that.

4

to make it right?

5

justifications, forcing us to go on and on and on.

6

don't have a protective order, either from the Court or

7

stipulation.

8

up, and get them to the Court, and then I will decide what I

9

want to do with them.

10

And if they had made errors, most

What can we do

Instead of getting concealment, frivolous

We do have an order saying seal these documents

THE COURT:

Let's ask Counsel, so we can bring this

11

hearing to a close, your response to that.

12

matters on the calendar we need to move through.

13

We still

MR. OLSEN:

We have other

I will attempt to be brief, your Honor,

14

but I think the C<?urt realizes that from day one we have been

15

playing hide and seek in this divorce matter.

16

discovery file is larger than the divorce file.

17

will look at the subpoena that's been provided for the Court

18

this morning on Bank One, first of all, that subpoena was sent

19

out long before Mr. Foster even entered an appearance as

20

counsel for a third party.

21

THE COURT:

In fact, the
If the Court

Let me ask a question, and see if we can

22

short circuit the entire process.

23

documents that are disputed by opposing counsel in your

24

possession this morning?

25

MR. OLSEN:

I do.

Do you have all the

Your Honor, Mr. Foster, I

9

1 J b e l i e v e -2

THE COURT:

Let me ask another question.

3

MR. OLSEN:

He ha3 indicated, I think, in his

4

pleadings, that I have lied about the fact that there are over

5

1,000 documents that I have.

6

integrity, I had my clerk count those documents, your Honor,

7

and I would proffer to the Court that, with the checks, there

8

are 4,828 documents.

9

carefully at the transcript, that the Court will note that

10

after the Court ordered me to deliver those documents, the

11

Court then said to make them available for copying by Counsel.

12

Now, I have retained those documents, waiting for counsel to

13

call to look at those documents, and to make copies of those

14

documents.

15

and I am delivering them to the Court.

For that reason, if the Court looks

And, for that reason, I have the documents today,

16

MR. FOSTER:

17

THE COURT:

18

When somebody questions my

No

—

Just a moment.

I let both of you talk.

Let me talk.

19

MR. FOSTER:

20

THE COURT:

I apologize, your Honor.
Both of you.

21

this Holt v. Holt case.

22

nearly two years.

23

in this lawsuit have been resolved.

I want to bring an end to

It has been hanging in the system for

I understood that all the substantive issues

24

MR. OLSEN:

They have.

25

THE COURT:

Why don't you take that box of records,

10
i > i

(A

1

and burn them?

2

MR. OLSEN:

I am happy to do whatever the Court wants

3 I to do with them.
4

THE COURT:

That's my suggestion.

Go recycle them.

5

We have a bin down here that some tree-growing plant in Oregon

6

wants us to recycle all of our papers.

7

there is not a copy in the world of those records, and the two

8

of you go put them in the recycling bin, and let's be done of

9

it?

10 J

MR. FOSTER:

11 J of what was said.
12

Making a statement somewhat corrective

Opposing counsel said he didn't say 1,000.

THE COURT:

I don't want to keep saddling up and

13

trying to ride this dead horse.

14

MR. FOSTER:

I understand.

15

look at these.

16

to me, and as a modification

17

Why don't you stipulate

I haven't had a chance to

The proposal I made was that they be delivered

THE COURT:

—

You have them.

If Counsel represents, as

18

an officer of the court, that those records represent

19

everything that was obtained pursuant to that subpoena in the

20

Holt case, give him the box, let him carry them out of here,

21

and you can do whatever you want with them.

22

MR. FOSTER:

Do we have a representation from Counsel

23

that he has not retained any copies of anything that was

24

subpoenaed from Bank One?

25

MR. OLSEN:

I will represent to the Court that I will

11

have my clerk run through every, single file that I have, and
if the Court's order is to destroy those copies, I will have
those copies destroyed,
THE COURT:
MR, FOSTER:

I accept that

—

What about the exhibits to the

deposition?
MR, OLSEN:
exhibits.
want.

You can do whatever you want with the

If you want to call the reporter, do whatever you

I don't care what you want to do with the exhibits.
MR. FOSTER:

you to cure it.
have asked

You caused the problem.

I would like

I would like copies of whatever they were.

I

—
MR. OLSEN:

He can get copies of the deposition.

can do anything he wants with that.
whatever he wants to do.

He

He can destroy it,

I don't care what he does with it.

The deposition has already been taken.

It is there.

Whatever

he wants to do with it, so be it.
THE COURT:

Prepare an order, and I will instruct

opposing counsel to sign it, and any documents that you want to
remove, pursuant to your stipulation, that were involved in the
deposition, take them, and do whatever you want with them.
MR. FOSTER:

We have a motion for sanctions.

We are

into it about eight grand now, your Honor, fighting for our
client's right not to be abused in the course of discovery, and
he has been.

12

1

THE COURT:

As I recall, this case has represented a

2

very acrimonious, cantankerous, long, drawn-out lawsuit, where

3

there have been allegations and counter allegations of deceit

4

and subterfuge and concealment and noncompliance and

5

noncooperation, ad nauseam-

6

both sides bear whatever costs you have incurred in pursuing it

7

or defending it or counter defense and counter pursuit, and

8

understand that the case is over now.

9

MR, FOSTER:

Let's just leave it alone, and let

I take it that's a denial of our motion

10 J for attorney's fees.
11

THE COURT:

It is.

Make sure Counsel has every

12

record in that box that the Court has ordered surrendered.

13

two of you enter into a stipulation that, pursuant to a signed

14

order, that any other documents that have surfaced from that

15

subpoena, you can do whatever you want with them.

16

Anything further?

17

MR. FOSTER:

18
19

The

Your Honor, I gather that I am to

prepare the order.
THE COURT:

Yes, prepare the order as it relates to

20

the surrendering of the documents, and the removal, by

21

stipulation of both counsel, of any documents that were used in

22

the deposition.

23

MR. OLSEN:

I think we can stipulate now that the

24

only document that will be removed from the deposition will be

25

the checks that were acquired from Bank One.

There will be no

13

1 I other documents that would be relevant.
2 1

MR. FOSTER:

The testimony would be relevant, your

3

Honor.

If he is testifying as to what this check means, when

4

was it issued, so on, I don't know how you can eliminate the

5 I check, and not eliminate the testimony.

What I would just as

6 I soon do is have the court reporter ordered to seal it.
7

If the

original has already been delivered to the Court, that the

8 I Court's copy be sealed, subject to further order,
9

THE COURT:

Let's do that.

If there is any reason to

10 I reopen it, just make a motion to the Court.
11 I

(This proceeding was concluded.)

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

14

C E R T I F I C A T E
I, BRAD

J,

YOUNG,

reported, as official

hereby

certify

that

I attended

and

court reporter, the proceedings in the

above-entitled and numbered matter before the Honorable Pat B.
Brian and that the foregoing is a true and correct transcription
of my stenographic notes thereof.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 16th day of S6pt., 1996.

R

ASst

BRAD J . jXO^NG
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
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Lynn G. Foster (#1105)
FOSTER & FOSTER L.C.
602 East Third South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 364-5633

F I L E D
CCf 1 -•;•'•.
CIerAoi&-nn».'^jncy
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Deputy O.*
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Attorney for Third Parties
Terrance E. Frank and Park City Pharmacy, Inc.

£&

SUMMTT COUNTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CLIFFORD E. HOLT,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs.
AUDREY N. HOLT,
Civil No. 954300067DA
Defendant.
Honorable Pat B. Brian

The Court, in the above-identified matter, heard arguments on 23 August 1996 at
approximately 9:30 a.m. Mitchell J. Olsen was present representing the Defendant, Audrey N.
Hoit and Lynn G. Foster was present representing third panies Terrance E. Frank and Park City
Pharmacy, Inc., counsel for the Plaintiff was not present. Being fully advised in the premises
and following full briefing and oral argument to the Court, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. Based upon the oral stipulation of counsel in open court, the transcript of the hearing
in the above-identified matter which took place on May 16, 1996 shall constitute the
Order as to the matters before the Court on May 16, 1996.
2. Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees is denied.

BOOixVi u HAUL 1 8 ' /

The Motion for sanctions by third parties Terrance E. Frank and Park City
Pharmacy, Inc. is denied.
Upon agreement of counsel, Defendant and Defendant's counsel were ordered to
provide to the third parties all of the documents of Park City Pharmacy, Inc. and any
copy thereof subpoenaed from Bank One by the Defendant, all of which were
represented by counsel for the Defendant to be physically in the courtroom,
following which Defendant's counsel delivered the same to counsel for the third
parties.
DATED

this / o
/

day of

iJCL

o <^2^3&96.
BY THE COURT

^ , ^ ( ^

Pat B. Brian
Third Judicial District Coui
sor^

1 \C^Nry

Approved as to form.

O

MS,

O
#

Mitch&l J. Olsen
Counsel for the Defendant
Date: f<-*f^~~ S<^ <2 3, / V ft
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Coxnpflo*'* Note*. — Former Form 29, *Ft»
^ o n for Order Granting Intermediate An-

DF HABEAS CORPUS

Form 30

peal," w u rededgnated Form 31. Former Form
34 w u redesignated u thla form.

Form 30, Subpoena.

3

Name
JAMED DEFENDANT:
re (here set forth the court or
lth
*
;
day of
such as the courthouse in the
o'clock ....M, and to
(naming the person on
lere to be dealt with according

Address
City, State

zrp

Telephone
IN THE

COURT,

ie complaint on file herein, a
on you, on or before the time

SUBPOENA

Plaintiff,
Judge

., STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY

v.
Case No.
Defendant.

teferencee, — Form of complaint,
Unary relief generally, Rule 65B.

TO:

nt

YOU AEE COMMANDED:

)F

[ ] to appear in the
Court at the place, date and time
specified below to testify in the above case.
[ ] to appear at the place, date and time specified below to testify at the
taking of a deposition in the above case.
[ ] to produce or permit inspection and copying of the following documents or objects at the place, date and time specified below (list documents or objects):

irt and a jury, Honorable
having been duly tried and

>ndant C. D. the sum of
°f
percent as pro-

[ ] to permit inspection of the following premises at the date and time
specified below.

^e dismissed on the merits,
ETA. B. his costs of action.]
day of
t i 9 _

PLACE

:k of Court

DATE AND TIME

Any organization not a party to this suit that is subpoenaed for the taking
of a deposition shall designate one or more ofiScers, directors, or managing
agents, or other person who consent to testify on its behalf, and may set forth,
for each person designated, the matters on which the person will testify. Rule
30(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Go£ i

Form 30
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ISSUING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE AND TITLE
DATE
(INDICATE IF ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT)
NOTICE TO PERSONS SERVED WITH A SUBPOENA
Subpoena to Appear at Trial, at Hearing, or at Deposition
1. If this subpoena commands you to appear to give testimony at trial or at
hearing, you must appear in person at the place designated in the subpoena.
2. If this subpoena commands you to appear to give testimony at deposition,
you must appear in person at the place designated in the subpoena. If you are
a resident of Utah, the subpoena may command you to appear only in the
county where you reside, or where you are employed, or where you transact
business in person, or where the court orders you to appear. If you are not a
resident of Utah, the subpoena may command you to appear only in the
county where you are served with the subpoena, or where the court orders.
3. If this subpoena commands you to appear to give testimony at trial, at
hearing, or at deposition, but does not command you to produce or to permit
inspection and copying of documents or tangible things, or inspection of premises, you have the right to object if the subpoena:
a. imposes an undue burden or expense upon you;
b. does not allow you a reasonable time to comply, which may be less
than 14 days, depending on the circumstances; or
c. commands you to appear at deposition at a place in violation of
paragraph 2, above.
4. To object to complying with the subpoena, you must file with the court
issuing the subpoena a motion to quash or modify the subpoena. You must
comply with the subpoena unless you have obtained a court order granting
you relief from the subpoena.
Subpoena to Produce or to Permit Inspection of Documents or Tangible Things
or to Permit Inspection of Premises
5. If this subpoena commands you to produce or to permit inspection and
copying of documents or tangible things, or to permit inspection of premises,
but does not command you to appear to give testimony at trial, at a hearing,
or at a deposition:
a. you need not appear in person at the place of production or inspection;
b. you must produce documents as you keep them in the ordinary
course of business or organize and label them to correspond with the
categories demanded in the subpoena; and
c. you need not make any copies or advance any costs for production,
inspection or copying. If you agree to make copies, the party who ha3
served the subpoena upon you must pay the reasonable costs of production and copying.
6. You have the right to object if the subpoena:
a. imposes an undue burden or expense upon you;
b. does not allow you at least 14 days to comply, unless the party
serving the subpoena has obtained a court order requiring an earlier
response;
c. requires you to disclose a trade secret or other confidential research,
development or commercial information;
d. requires you to disclose privileged communication with your attorney or privileged trial preparation materials; or
e. requires you to disclose an unretained expert's opinion or information not describing specific events or occurrences in dispute and resulting
from expert's study made not at the request of any party.
7. To object to a subpoena for one of the reasons stated in paragraph 6, you
must provide notice in writing of your objection to the party or attorney
Uu^.j
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Form 31

gsrving the subpoena before the date specified in the subpoena for you to
respond. If your objection ia baaed on either paragraph 6(c), 6(d), or 6(e), your
written objection must describe the nature of the documents, coramunicationa
or things that you object to producing with sufficient specificity to enable the
party or attorney serving the subpoena to contest your objection. You must
a^o comply with the subpoena to the extent that it commands production or
mspection of materials to which you do not object.
8. After you make timely written objection, the party who has served the
subpoena upon you must obtain a court order to compel you to comply with the
subpoena. The party must give you a copy of its motion for a court order and
notice of any hearing before the court. You have the right to file a response to
the motion with the court and a right to attend any hearing. After you make a
timely written objection, you have no obligation to comply with the subpoena
until the party serving the subpoena has served you with a court order that
compels you to comply.
9. If this subpoena commands you to produce or to permit inspection and
copying of documents or tangible things, or to permit inspection of premises,
and to appear to give testimony at trial, at a hearing, or at a deposition, you
may object to the production or inspection of documents or tangible things, or
inspection of premises, by following the procedure identified in paragraph 7.
Even though you object to production or inspection of documents or tangible
things, or inspection of premises, you must appear in person at the trial, at the
hearing or at the deposition unless you obtain an order of the court by following the procedures identified in paragraph 4.

Form 31. Notice of Execution, Exemptions and
Right to a Hearing.
IMPORTANT: YOUR PROPERTY MAY BE TAKEN TO PAY A CREDITOR.
PLEASE READ THIS CAREFULLY.
The attached Writ of Execution has been issued on request of a judgment
creditor (the Plaintiff) who sued you and got a judgment against you. This
means that land or personal property owned by you may be taken by the
Plaintiff to pay the judgment against you.
The law provides that certain property cannot be taken to pay judgments.
Such property is said to be exempt. The following is a partial list of property
that is or may be exempt:
1 A homestead up to the amount allowed by law (see Utah Code, Section
78-23-4 regarding the proper procedure to declare and file a homestead)
2. A motor vehicle used in trade or business up to the amount allowed by
law
3. Tools of the trade up to the amount allowed by law
4. Social Security Benefits
5 Supplemental Security Income Benefits (SSI)
6 Veterans' Benefits
7 Unemployment Benefits
8 Worker's Compensation Benefits
9 Public Assistance (Welfare)
10 Alimony or Child Support
11. Certain Pensions
12. Part of all of wages or other earnings from personal services
13 Certain furnishings and appliances
14. Certain musical instruments
15 Certain heirlooms
This is a partial list and other various property exemptions may be available under federal law or the Utah Exemption Statute. You may want to
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the papers should not be deemed to violate the
rule merely because they were prepared in a
Jot matnx printer. Aa currently written, this
paragraph also removes any confusion concerning the top margin and left margin requirements (now 2 inches and 1 inch respectively),
and this paragraph imposes new requirements
for right and bottom margins (both one-half
inch).
Paragraph (e) This paragraph, which is an
addition to the rule, requires typed signature
lines and signatures in permanent black or
blue ink.

Rule 11

Paragraph (0 The changes in this paragraph make it clear that the clerk muat accept
all papers for filing, even though they may violate the rule, but the clerk may require counsel
to substitute conforming for nonconforming papers. The clerk is given discretion to waive requirements of the rule for parties who are not
represented by counsel, for good cause shown,
the court may relieve parties of the obligation
to comply with the rule or any part of it.
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a) to (c)
of this rule are similar to Rule 10, F.RC.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Exhibits.

of a pleading to clarify or explain the same, an
exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose
of supplying necessary material averments nor
can the content of the exhibit be taken as part
of the allegations of the pleading itself. Girard
v Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983).

—Use as pleadings.
While an exhibit may be considered aa a part

Cited in State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646
P2d 727 (Utah 1982).

ANALYSIS

Exhibits.
—Use as pleadings.
Cited.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading
§§ 23 to 56, 69, 117.
C.J.S. — 71 C J S. Pleading §§ 5, 9, 63 to 98,
371 to 375, 418.
A.L.R. — Propriety of attaching photographs to a pleading, 33 A.L.R.3d 322.

Propriety and effect of use of fictitious name
of plaintiff in federal court, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 369.
Key Numbers. — Pleading *=» 4, 13, 15,
381/2 to 75, 307 to 312, 340

Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers;
representations to court; sanctions.
(a) S i g n a t u r e . Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or,
if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party.
Each paper shall state the signer's address and telephone number, if any.
Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be
stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being
called to the attention of the attorney or party.
(b) R e p r e s e n t a t i o n s to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion,
or other paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best
of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or,
if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information
or belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the
court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject
to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attor-
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neys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible
for the violation.
(1; How initiated.
(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be
made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe
the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be
served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented
to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such
other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim,
defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party
prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees
incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In appropriate circumstances, a law firm may be held jointly responsible for violations
committed by its partners, members, and employees.
(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter
an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause
why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule 3hall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of
such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject
to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist
of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a
penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective
deterrence, an order diracting payment to the movant of some or all of the
reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of
the violation.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented
party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary
dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party
which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis
for the sanction imposed.
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule
do not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and
motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1997.)
A d v i s o r y Committee Note. — The 1997
a m e n d m e n t conform state Rule 11 with federal Rule 11 One difference between the rules
concerns holding a law firm jointly responsible
for violations by a member of the firm. Federal
Rule 11(c)(1)(A) states* "Absent exceptional
circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly
responsible for violations committed by its
partners, associates, and employees." Under
the federal rule, joint responsibility is presumed unless the judge determines not to impose joint responsibility State Rule 11(c)(1)(A)
provides "In appropriate circumstances, a law
firm may be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, members, and

employees " Under the state rule, joint responsibility is not presumed, and the judge may
impose joint responsibility in appropriate circumstances What constitutes appropriate circumstances is left to the discretion of the judge,
but might include: repeated violations, especially after earlier sanctions;
firm-wide
sanctionable practices; or a 3anctionable practice approved by a supervising attorney and
committed by a subordinate.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1997 amendment rewrote this rule
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 11, F R C P
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Adoption proceeding
Amendment of complaint
\opeals
Nature of duty imposed
Reasonable inquiry
Sanctions not warranted
\ idation
—Question of law
—Sanctions
—Standard
C.ted
Adoption proceeding.
In an adoption proceeding, the trial court
properly imposed Rule 11 sanctions against attorney who failed to make reasonable inquiry
,nto existing law, made allegations in the
amended petition that were not well grounded
in fact, failed to obtain a preplacement adoptive study or temporary placement order, failed
to comply with the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children, knew or should have
known the natural mother's consent was
flawed, knew the natural father would not consent to the adoption, and failed to make a reasonable inquiry as to whether the natural fatness parental nghts were terminable Giffen
v R W L , 913 P 2d 761 (Utah Ct. App 1996)
Amendment of c o m p l a i n t
Amendment by an attorney of the facta
stated m a complaint was sufficient to establish those facta as they would have been by a
verified complaint before the changes made by
this rule making verification unnecessary
Calderv Third Judicial Dist Court ex rel Salt
Lake County, 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P 2d 168
fl954)
Appeals.
After voluntary dismissal by plaintiffs, the
rral court's retention of jurisdiction to enforce
sanctions under this rule did not legally prejudice plaintiffs and there was no final appealable order Barton v Utah Transit Auth , 872
P 2d 1036 (Utah 1994)
Nature of duty imposed.
This rule emphasizes an attorney's public
duty as an officer of the court, as opposed to the
attorney's private duty to represent a client's
interest zealously Clark v Booth, 821 P 2 d
1146 (Utah 199b
Reasonable inquiry.
Certification by an attorney "that to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief
formed after a reasonable inquiry the com
plaint is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law" does not require him to
obtain a favorable expert medical opinion before filing a medical malpractice action
Deschamps v Pulley, 784 P 2d 471 (Utah Ct
App 1989)
Under this rule, a party need not have
reacned the correct conclusion, he need only
nave made a reasonable inquiry Barnard v
I tan State Bar, 857 P 2d 917 (Utah 1993)
Because attorney's reading of the law as it
existed when he commenced his action was at
least plausible, sanctions under this rule were

not warranted Barnard v Utah State Bar, 857
P2d 917 (Utah 1993)
Sanctions not warranted
On motions to impose sanctions against
plaintiff Utah State Bar filed by defendants
engaged in practice of public adjusting and
based on the grounds that (1) the original complaint named as plaintiff the "Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar" instead of
the 'Utah State Bar," (2) there were no facts to
support the claim that one defendant was engaged m public adjusting, and 3) there was no
basis in the law to support the Bar's assertion
in its original complaint that first-party adjusting constituted the unauthorized practice
of law, motions were properly denied since the
misnomer of plaintiff in the original complaint
was a technical error which did not cause defendants any prejudice and was corrected in
the Bar's amended complaint, since Bar counsel had evidence that defendants were engaged
m public adjusting, and since law as to firstparty adjusting was unsettled Utah State Bar
v Sorensen, 910 P 2d 1227 (Utah 1996)
Violation.
—Question of law
Whether specific conduct amounts to a violation of this rule is a question of law Taylor v
Estate of Taylor, 770 P 2 d 163 Utah Ct App.
1989), Jeschke v Willis, 811 P2d 202 (Utah
Ct App 1991)
—Sanctions.
This rule gives m a l courts great leeway to
tailor the sanction to fit the requirements of
the particular case. Taylor v Estate of Taylor,
770 P 2d 163 OJtah Ct App 1989), Giffen v
R W L , 913 P2d 761 (Utah Ct App 1996)
Attaching the wrong document to a complaint violated this rule because a reasonable
inquiry would na\e revealed the mistake,
award of attorney fees was appropnate because
the error caused defendants to ncur legal expense in researching the validity of an irrelevant document and preparing a motion to dismiss based on i t Taylor v Estate of Taylor,
770 P 2d 163 (Utan Ct App 1989)
Award of costs and attorney fees was an appropnate sanction for attempting *o go forward
with a class action that, m light of the complete resolution of the matter eleven months
pnor, was "unconscionable and beyond reason ' Schoney v Memorial Estates, Inc , 863
P2d 59 (Utah Ct App 1993'
—Standard
Sanctions were improper against an attorney where opposing parties conceded that no
particular document was signed m violation of
the rule, but simply argued tnat even if the
attorney believed the case was well grounded
when he filed the complaint, he should have
known after he met with counsel for defen
dant3 that the case could not go forward
Jeschke v Willis, 81 i P 2d 202 I tan Ct App
1991)
Utah appellate courta should use the threestandard approach *n reviewing a trial court's
Rule 11 findings This approacn includes. (1)
rev lewmg the trial court's findings of fact un-
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der the clearh erroneous standard, (2) reviewing the trial court's ultimate conclusion that
Rule 11 was violated and any subsidiary legal
conclusions uncer the correction of error standard, and (3) reviewing the trial court's determination as to the type and amount of sanction
to be imposed under the abuse of discretion
standard Barnard v Sutliff 846 P.2d 1229
(Utah 1992), Giffen v R W L , 913 P2d 761
(Utah Ct App 1996)
The determination of whether conduct vio-
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lates Rule 11 is made on an objective basis
Giffen v R W L , 913 P 2d 761 (Utah C t App
1996)
Cited in Walker v Carlson, 740 P 2d 1372
(Utah Ct App 1987), State v Perdue, 813 P 2d
1201 (Utah Ct App 1991), Runensburger v
Rimensburger, 841 P 2 d 709 (Utah Ct App
1992), Crowther v Mower, 876 P 2d 876 (Utah
Ct App 1994)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Legislate e Enactments — At
torney's Fees 1989 Utah L Rev 342
B n g h a m Young L a w Review — Curbing
Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation Enough Is
Enough, 1981 B Y U L Rev 579
Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation
We're Not There Yet, 1981 B Y U L Rev 597
Note, Appellate Review of Rule 11 Issues —
De Novo or Abuse of Discretion 7 Thomas v
Capital Security Services, Inc, 1989 B Y U L
Rev 877
Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics,
1991 B Y U L Rev 959
Fines Under New F e d e i a l C m l Rule 11 The
New Monetarv Sanctions for the "Stop-andThink Again" Rule, 1993 B Y U L Rev 879
Am. JUT. 2d — 61A Am Jur 2d Pleading
§§ 339 to 349
C J S — 7 1 C J S Pleading §§ 339 to 366
A-L.R. — Liability of attorney, acting for client, for malicious prosecution, 46 A L R . 4th
249
Inherent power of federal district court to
impose monetary sanctions on counsel m absence of contempt of court, 77 A.L R. Fed 789
Comment Vote — General principles regard
ing imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-

eral Rules of Civil Procedure 95 A.LJL Fed
107
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions for defamation, 95 A L R . Fed. 181
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in action
for wrongful discharge from employment, 96
A L R . Fed. 13
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions for securities fraud, 97 A.L R. Fed 107
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions for infliction of emotional distress, 98
A L R Fed. 442
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, m antitrust actions, 99 A.LR. Fed. 573
Procedural requirements for imposition of
sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 100 A L R Fed 556
Key Numbers. — Pleading *=» 287 to 304

Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty
days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless otherwise expressly provided by statute or order of the court A party served with a
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto
within twenty days after the service upon him The plaintiff shall serve his
reply to a counterclaim m the answer within twenty days after service of the
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service
of the order, unless the order otherwise directs The service of a motion under
tins rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed
by order of the court
(1) If the court demes the motion or postpones its disposition until the
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten
days after notice of the court's action,
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of
the more definite statement
(b) H o w p r e s e n t e d . Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted m the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insuffi-
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Conservator or guardian for an incompetent,
priority and preference in appointment of, 65
A.L.R.3d 991.
Defamation action as surviving plaintiffs
death, under 8tatute not specifically covering
action, 42 A.L.R.4th 272.
Power of incompetent apouse'9 guardian or
representative to aue for granting or vacation

Rule 26

of divorce or annulment of marriage, or to
make compromise or settlement in such auit,
32 A.L.R.5th 673.
Sufficiency of suggestion of death of party,
filed under Rule 25(a il) of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, governing substitutions of
party after death, 105 A.L.R. Fed. 816.
Key Numbers. — Parties *» 59.

PART V.
DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY.
Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery.
(a) D i s c o v e r y methods. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of
the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes;
physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission.
(b) Discovery s c o p e and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the
court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location
of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground
for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial
if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in
Subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or
less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or
(iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the
parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or
pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c).
(2) I n s u r a n c e a g r e e m e n t s - A party may obtain discovery of the existence and contents of any insurance agreement under which any person
carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a
judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. Information concerning
the insurance agreement is not by reason of disclosure admissible in
evidence at trial. For purposes of this paragraph, an application for insurance shall not be treated as part of an insurance agreement.
(3) T r i a l p r e p a r a t i o n : Materials. Subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and
tangible things otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this
rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another
party or by or for that other party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery ha3 substantial need of the materials
in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.
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In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has
been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation.
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that party. Upon
request, a person not a party may obtain without the required showing a
statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by
that person. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court
order. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses
incurred in relation to the motion. For purposes of this paragraph, a
statement previously made is (A) a written statement signed or otherwise
adopted or approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is
a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person making it and contemporaneously recorded.
(4) T r i a l p r e p a r a t i o n : E x p e r t s . Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of
litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows:
(A) (i) A party may through interrogatories require any other
party to identify each person whom the other party expects to
call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on
which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance
of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify
and a summary of the grounds for each opinion.
(ii) Upon motion, the court may order further discovery by
other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope and such
provisions, pursuant to Subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule, concerning fees and expenses as the court may deem appropriate.
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in
anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b)
or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is
impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result,
(i) The court shall require t h a t the party seeking discovery
pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to
discovery under Subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this
rule; and
(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision
(b)(4)(A)(ii) of this rule the court may require, and with respect
to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the
court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other
party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred
by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert,
(c) P r o t e c t i v e o r d e r s . Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is
pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the
district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:
(1) that the discovery not be had;
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place;
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(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other
than that selected by the party seeking discovery;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the
discovery be limited to certain matters;
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons
designated by the court;
(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the
court;
(7^ that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way;
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court
may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person
provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award
of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Unless the court upon motion, for
the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders
otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that
a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not
operate to delay any other party's discovery.
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has responded to a request for discovery with a response that was complete when made is under no
duty to supplement his response to include information thereafter acquired,
except as follows:
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with
respect to amy question directly addressed to (A) the identity and location
of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, and (B) the identity
of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the
subject matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his
testimony.
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he
obtains information upon the basis of which (A) he knows that the response was incorrect when made, or (B) he knows that the response
though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are
such that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing
concealment.
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the
court, agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through new
requests for supplementation of prior responses.
(fy Discovery conference. At any time after commencement of an action,
the court may direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a
conference on the subject of discovery. The court shall do so upon motion by
the attorney for any party if the motion includes:
(1) a statement of the issues as they then appear;
(2) a proposed plan and schedule of discovery;
(3) any limitations proposed to be placed on discovery;
(4) any other proposed orders with respect to discovery; and
(5) a statement showing that the attorney making the motion has
made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with opposing attorneys on
the matters set forth in the motion. Each party and his attorney are
under a duty to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery
plan if a plan is proposed by the attorney for any party. Notice of the
motion shall be served on all parties. Objections or additions to matters
set forth in the motion shall be served not later than ten days after
service of the motion.
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Following the discover} conference, the court shall enter an order tentatively identifying the issues for discovery purposes, establishing a plan and
schedule for discovery, setting limitations on discovers, if any and determining such other matters, including the allocation of expenses, as are necessary
for the proper management of discovery in the action An order may be altered
or amended vvhenever justice so requires
Subject to the right of a party who properly moves for a disco\ery conference
to prompt convening of the conference, the court may combine the discovery
conference with a pretrial conference authorized by Rule 16
(g) Signing of discovery r e q u e s t s , r e s p o n s e s , a n d objections. Every
request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party represented b \ an atcorne} shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his
individual name, whose address shall be stated A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the request, response, or objection and state
his address The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification
that he has read the request, response, or objection and that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is (1)
consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase m the cost of litigation, and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the
discovery already had m the case, the amount m controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake m the litigation If a request, response, or objection
is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the party making the request, response, or
objection, and a party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to
it until it is signed
If a certification is made m violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the party on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is made, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount
of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney fee
(h) D e p o s i t i o n w h e r e action p e n d i n g in a n o t h e r state. Any party to an
action or proceeding in another state may take the deposition of any person
within this state, m the same manner and subject to the same conditions and
limitations as if such action or proceeding were pending in this state, provided
that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of such deposition
shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in which the person
whose deposition is to be taken resides or is to be served, and provided further
that all matters arising during the taking of such deposition which by the
rules are required to be submitted to the court shall be submitted to the court
in the county where the deposition is being taken
(Amended effective Jan 1, 1987 )
Compiler's Notes — Thus rule corresponds
to Rule 26 F R C P
Cros8-References — Admissibility of evi
dence § 78 21 3 U R C P 43(a)
Continuance to permit discovery, U R C P
56(f)
Depositions upon oral examination, I R C P
30(c)
Depositions
use in court proceedings
I R C P 32
Depositions *hen taken I R C P 30(a)
Discover} procedures Rule 4 502 Rules of
Judicial Administration
Exclusion of deposition from evidence
I R C P 32(b)

Expert and other opinion testimony, U R E
701 to 706
Fee for filing notice of deposition concerning
action m another state § 21 1 5
Liability insurance, admissibility of U R.E
411
Motions
evidence on by depositions
I R C P 43(b)
Privileges §§ 78 24 8 78-24-9 UR.E 501 et
seq
Summary judgment discover) supporting or
opposing motion for I R C P 56(e)
Terminate or limit examination, motion to,
U R C P 30(d)

75

ASA

Applicability of rule
Appellate review
—Denial of discovery
Privilege against self
Protective order
—Trade secrets
—Waiver
Purpose of rule
Scope of discovery
—In general
Relevance
—Insurance agreement
—Official information
Trial preparation
—Discovery from state
—Eminent comain
—Insurance documents
—Otherwise discoverab
—-Subjective matters
—Testimony of witness
Cited
Applicability of rule
The taking of deposi
Utah Rules of Civil Pro
an action to remove a pu
for malfeasance pursuar
6 State v Courts, 11 Uu
(1961)
Appellate n viev,
—Denial of discovery
When denial of a disc
mined on review to have
den of demonstrating tha
was not prejudicial is up
discovery As sew v Ha.
(Utah Ct ApD 1994), c
13 (Utah 1995)
Privilege against self
Privilege against self
asserted m civil discove
fuse to answei interroga
in depositions demands
menta, and requests for
to sustain an assertion or
must show that the respc
pelled might be incrimin
& Loan Ass'n v Scham
(Utah 1984)
Protective order
—Trade secrets
Materials that are the
order under Subdivision (
ically privileged for purpc
the federal Freedom of
cause the determination c
contain trade secrets unc
be made solely b> applyir
tion for trade secrets ana
aa! or financial informa
emption itself Anderso
Health & Human Servs
Cir 1990)
—Waiver
Inaction and delay in fi
tec
tion with respect to doc
w
ork product waives wha

74

cer an order tenta3lishmg a plan and
any and determines as are necessary
rder may be altered
iscovery conference
abine the discovery
le 16
objections. Every
e by a party repreney of record m his
who is not repreobjection and state
utes a certification
at to the best of his
le inquiry it is (1)
aw or a good faith
osting law, (2) not
" to cause unnecesd (3) not unreasonis of the case, the
rsy, and the imporsponse, or objection
>tly after the onusquest, response, or
ion with respect to
^"tj upon motion or
made the certificayection is made, or
to pay the amount
n, including a reae

- Any party to an
tion of any person
m e conditions and
Misstate, provided
of such deposition
which the person
d provided further
tion which by the
ratted to the court

ruon testimonv

LR£

deDosition concerning
. S 21 1 5
drnissibihty of L H E
°n»

by

deposit ons

"3 24 9 U R E 501 ec
i3covery supDor n* or
R C P 56(e)
animation mot on co

75

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 26

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Applicability of rule
Appellate review
—Denial of discovery request
Privilege against self incrimination
Protective order
—Trade secrets
—Waiver
purpose of rule
Scope of discovery
—In general
Relevance
—Insurance agreements
—Official information privilege
Trial preparation
—Discovery from state
—Eminent domain
—Insurance documents
—Otherwise discoverable records
—Subjective matters
—Testimony of witness.
Cited
Applicability of r u l e .
The taking of depositions p u r s u a n t to the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable in
an action to remove a public official from office
for malfeasance pursuant to Title 77, Chapter
6 State v Geurta, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P 2d 12
(1961)
Appellate review
—Denial of d i s c o v e r y r e q u e s t .
When denial of a discovery request is deter
mined on review to have been in error, the bur
den of demonstrating that the erroneous denial
was not prejudicial la upon t h e party resisting
discovery Askew v Hardrnan, 884 P 2d 1258
(Utah Ct App 1994), cert granted, 892 P2d
13 (Utah 1995)
Privilege a g a i n s t self-incrimination.
Privilege against self-incrimination may be
asserted in civil discovery proceedings to re
fuse to answer interrogatories, questions posed
in depositions, demands for production of documents, and requests for admissions, however,
to sustain an assertion of the privilege, a party
must show that the response sought to be compelled might be incriminating First Fed Sav
& Loan Ass'n v Schamanek, 684 P 2 d 1257
(Utah 1984)
Protective o r d e r
—Trade secrets
Materials that are the subject of a protective
order under Subdivision (c)(7) are not automat
ically privileged for purposes of Exemption 4 of
the federal Freedom of Information Act be
cause the determination of whether documents
contain trade secrets under Exemption 4 is to
be made solely by applying the express exemption for trade secrets and confidential commer
cial or financial information found in the ex
°mption itself Anderson v Department of
Health & Human Servs, 907 F 2d 936 (10th
Cir 1990)
—Waiver
Inaction and delay in filing a motion for protection with respect to documents alleged to be
work product waives whatever right a defen-

dant may have been able to assert Moreover a
defendant's failure to demonstrate any diligence whatsoever in asser^ng the privilege is
itself a waiver Gold Standard Inc / Amen
can Barrick Resources Corp 805 P 2d 164
(Utah 1990)
P u r p o s e of rule.
The purposes of discovers rules are to make
discovery as simple and efficient as possible by
eliminating any unnecessary technicalities,
and to remove elements of surprise or trickery
so that the parties and the court can determine
the facta and resolve the ^ssues as directly,
fairly and expeditiously as possible Ellis v
Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189 429 P 2d 39 (1967)
Scope of d i s c o v e r y
—In generaL
Discovery should be liberally permitted
where it is used in eliminating non-controversial matters and in identifying, narrowing and
clarifying the issues on which contest may
prove to be necessary State ex rel Rd Comm'n
v Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382, 412 P 2d 914 (1966)
The use of discovery should not be extended
to permit ferreting undulv into detail, nor to
have the effect of cross examining the opposing
party or his witnesses, nor should it be distorted into a "fishing expedition " State ex rel
Rd Comm'n v Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382,412 P 2d
914 (1966)
Relevance.
The ultimate objective of any lawsuit is a
determination of the dispute between the parties, and whatever helps to attain that objective is "relevant" to the lawsuit Ellis v Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P 2d 39 (1967)
—Insurance agreements.
Defendant in personal injury action had to
answer in discovery procedure whether he was
insured and name of any insurer and amount
of coverage, scope of inquiry as defined in
phrase "the subject m a t e r of the action" allowed questions pertaining to prospect of actually recovering damages as against contention
that discovery in question was unwarranted
intrusion into private affairs Ellis v Gilbert,
19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P-2d 39 (1967)
—Official information privilege
Police department personnel and internal affairs files are within tbe scope of discovery but
the trial court is required to balance the com
petmg interests through an in camera examinat on of the materials ror which the official
nformation privilege ~s claimed Madsen v
United Television, Inc 801 P 2d 912 (Utah
1990)
Trial p r e p a r a t i o n
For written materials to fall under the protection of Subdivision (b)(3), three criteria
must be met the material must be (1) documents and tangible things otherwise discover
able (2) prepared in anticipation of litigation
or ror trial, (3) by or for another party or by or
for that party's representative Gold Standard,
Inc v American Bamck Resources Corp , 805
P 2d 164 (Utah 1990^
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—Discovery from state.
One of the special circumstances which the
court may consider in determining whether to
permit discovery of materials prepared in anticipation of litigation is that the party from
which discovery is sought is the state; defendant in eminent domain action could properly
discover names and addresses of state witnesses and state's appraisal of value of land
and improvements to be taken, but not value of
underground pipe installations on state land
and what plaintiff considered to be highest and
best use of defendant's property. State ex rel.
Road Comxn'n v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382, 412
P.2d 914 (1966).
—Eminent domain.
A condemnor's appraisal report in eminent
domain cases is subject to pretrial discovery,
and does not lie within the aegis of the attorney's work-product immunity. Utah DOT v.
Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d 481 (Utah 1979).
—Insurance documents.
Documents in an insurance claim file may be
protected as work product; however, whether a
document prepared by an insurer is prepared
in anticipation of litigation is a question of fact
to be determined by the trial court on a caseby-case basis. Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d
469 (Utah 1996).
In determining whether documents in an insurance claim file were prepared in anticipation of litigation, the trial court should consider the nature of the requested documents,
the reason the documents were prepared, the
relationship between the preparer of the document and the party seeking its protection from
discovery, the relationship between the litigating parties, and other relevant facts. Askew v.
Hardman, 918 P.2d 469 (Utah 1996).
—Otherwise discoverable records.
Claim of privileged communication as to
records given to attorney, based on generalization that litigation was anticipated from the
day records were started, did not provide
grounds for barring otherwise justified discovery of records. Jackson v. Kennecott Copper
Corp., 27 Utah 2d 310, 495 P.2d 1254 (1972).
Attorney involvement is only one factor to be
weighed in determining whether material was
prepared in anticipation of litigation. Gold
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Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources
Corp., 805 P.2d 164 (Utah 1990).
A letter prepared because of a threatened
suit outlining a retainer agreement and setting up a plan for allocating costs and burdens
among the clients in the event of litigation, but
"which did not contain any legal strategies, theories, or conclusions of the clients or their attorneys, was not work product, nor was it protected by the attorney-client privilege. Gold
Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources
Corp., 801 P.2d 909 (Utah 1990).
—Subjective matters.
Prohibition in former Rule 30(b> against discovery of "any part of the writing uiat reflects
an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories, or, except as provided in Rule 35, the conclusions of an expert"
dealt only with subjective matters, not with
evidence of objective facts, that is, occurrences,
conditions and circumstances. Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 245 P.2d 224 (1952).
Provision prohibiting discovery of attorneys
"mental impressions, conclusions, [etc]" was
absolute and prohibited discovery of such matters in all cases; trial court erred in ordering
discovery upon showing of undue prejudice,
hardship or injustice. Mower v. McCarthy, 122
Utah 1, 245 P.2d 224 (1952).
—Testimony of witness.
Where plaintiff in wrongful death action
sought transcript of testimony of witnesses to
fatal accident, given by them to defense counsel in preparation for litigation, there was adequate showing of undue prejudice, hardahip
and injustice to plaintiff if transcript was not
produced, since it appeared that transcript provided the only source of information contained
in it, that plaintiff had used due diligence in
seeking to obtain such information in other
ways, and that matter in transcript was not
privileged; therefore, production was ordered,
notwithstanding that transcript was part of defense counsel's "work product." Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 245 P.2d 224 (1952).
Cited in Jensen v. Thomas, 570 PJ2d 695
(Utah 1977); Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787
P.2d 525 (Utah C t App. 1990); Berrett v.
Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 830 P.2d 291 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992); Benson ex rel. Benson v. I.H.C.
Hosps., 866 P.2d 537 (Utah 1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Discovery of Liability
Insurance Permitted by Rule 26(b) of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, 1968 Utah L. Rev. 436.
Brigham Young Law Review. — Curbing
Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is
Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 579.
Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation:
We're Not There Yet, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 597.
A New Antidote for an Opponent's Pretrial
Discovery Misconduct: Treating the Misconduct at Trial as an Admission by Conduct of
the Weakness of the Opponent's Case, 1993
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 793.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions
and Discovery §§ 12 to 14.
C J . S . — 27 CJ.S. Discovery §§ 20 to 23, 63.
A.L.R. — RijLrht of party to have his attorney

or physician, or a court reporter, present during his physical or mental examination by a
court-appointed expert, 7 A.L.R.3d 881.
Timeliness of application for compulsory
physical examination of injured party in personal injury action, 9 A.L.R.3d 1146.
Pretrial examination or discovery to ascertain from defendant in action for injury, death,
or damages, existence and amount of liability
insurance and insurer's identity, 13 A.L.R.3d
822.
Medical malpractice action, scope of defendant's duty of pretrial discovery in, 15
A.L.R.3d 1446.
Disclosure of name, identity, address, occupation, or business of client as violation of attorney-client privilege, 16 A.L.R.3d 1047.
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Compelling party to disclose information in
handa of affiliated or aubaidiary corporation, or
independent contractor, not made party to suit,
19 A.L.R.3d 1134.
Physician-patient privilege, commencing action involving physical condition of plaintiff or
decedent aa waiving, aa to diacovery proceedings, 21 A.L.R.3d 912.
Waiver of incompetency of witness, taking
deposition or serving interrogatories in civil
case as, 23 A.L.R.3d 389.
Libel and slander application of privilege attending statements made in course of judicial
proceedings to pretrial deposition and discovery procedures, 23 A.L.R.3d 1172.
Physician-patient privilege, pretrial testimony or diacloaure on diacovery by party to
personal injury action aa to nature of injuries
or treatment as waiver of, 25 A.L.R.3d 1401.
Right of defendant in personal injury action
to designate physician to conduct medical examination of plaintiff, 33 AJLR.3d 1012.
Dead man's statute, personal representative's loaa of rights under, by prior institution
of discovery proceedings, 35 A.L.R.3d 955.
Assertion of privilege in pretrial discovery
proceedings aa precluding waiver of privilege
at trial, 36 A.L.K3d 1367.
Patient's statements or declarations, admissibility of physician's testimony as to, other
than res gestae, during medical examinations,
37 A.L.R.3d 778.
Privilege against self-incrimination as
ground for refusal to produce noncorporate documents in possession of person asserting privilege but owned by another, 37 A.L.R.3d 1373.
Discovery, in medical malpractice action, of
names of other patients to whom defendant has
given treatment aimilar to that allegedly injuring plaintiff, 74 A.L.R.3d 1055.
Applicability of attorney-client privilege to
evidence or testimony in subsequent action between parties originally represented contemporaneously by same attorney, with reference to
communication to or from one party, 4
A . L i U t h 765.
Physician-patient privilege aa extending to
patient's medical or hospital records, 10
AX.R.4th 552.
Propriety of discovery order permitting "destructive testing" of chattel in civil case, 11
A.L.R.4th 1245.
Refusal of defendant in "public figure" libel
case to identify claimed sources as raising presumption against existence of source, 19
A.L.R.4th 919.
Absent or unnamed class members in class
action in 3tate court as subject to discovery, 28
A.L.R.4th 986.

Rule 27

Necessity of determination or showing of liability for punitive damagea before discovery or
reception of evidence of defendant's wealth, 32
A.L.R.4th 432.
Abuse of process action baaed on misuse of
discovery or deposition procedures after commencement of civil action without seizure of
person or property, 33 A.L.R.4th 650.
Protective orders limiting diasemination of
financial information obtained by depoaition or
discovery in state civil actions, 43 A.L.R.4th
121.
Right of independent expert to refuse to testify as to expert opinion, 50 A.LJR.4th 680.
Discovery: right to ex parte interview with
injured party's treating physician, 50
A.LJUth 714.
Discovery of defendant's sales, earnings, or
profits on issue of punitive damagea in tort action, 54 A.L.R.4th 998.
Discovery of identity of blood donor, 56
A . L i U t h 755.
Propriety of allowing state court civil litigant to call expert witness whose name or address was not disclosed during pretrial discovery proceedings, 58 A.L.R.4th 653.
Discovery, in civil proceeding, of records of
criminal investigation by state grand jury, 69
A.LS.4th 298.
Discovery of trade secret in state court action, 75 A.L.R.4th 1009.
Propriety and extent of state court protective
order restricting party's right to disclose discovered information to others engaged in similar litigation, 83 A . L i U t h 987.
Discoverability of traffic accident reports
and derivative information, 84 A.L.R.4th 15.
AJL.R. — State statutes or regulations expressly governing disclosure of fact that person
has tested positive for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (ADDS), 12 AXJR.5th 149.
Restriction on dissemination of information
obtained through pretrial discovery proceedings as violating Federal Constitution's First
Amendment — federal cases, 81 A.L.R. Fed.
471.
Protection from discovery of attorney's opinion work product under Rule 26(b)(3), Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 84 A.L.R. Fed. 779.
Modification of protective order entered pursuant to Rule 26(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 A.L.R. Fed. 538.
Academic peer review privilege in federal
court, 85 A.L.R. Fed. 691.
Key Numbers. — Discovery *» 28, 31, 33,
67.

Rule 27. Depositions before action or pending appeal.
(a) Before action.
(1) Petition. A person who desires to perpetuate his own testimony or
that of another person regarding any matter that may be cognizable in
any court of this state may file a verified petition in the district court of
the county in which any expected adverse party may reside.
The petition shall be entitled in the name of the petitioner and shall
show: (1) that the petitioner expects to be a party to an action cognizable

Tab 9
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(c) Disqualification for interest. No deposition shall be taken before a
person who is a relative or employee or attorney or counsel of any of the
parties, or is a relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or is financially interested in the action.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially similar to Rule 28, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Oaths, who may administer, § 78-24-16.

Subpoena of person in foreign country,
U.R.C.P. 45(d)(3).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Foreign countries.
—Depositions as evidence.
Foreign countries.
—Depositions as evidence.
In action for workmen's compensation
brought by mother of deceased employee as his
alleged dependent, depositions of testimony of

nonparties, taken in foreign country without
notice, stipulation, or order authorizing them,
there being no appearance by employer at taking of depositions, and no opportunity for crossexamination, amounted to no more than ex
parte affidavits, and were not competent evidence. Robles v. Industrial Comm'n, 77 Utah
408, 296 P. 600 (1931).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am, Jur. 2d Depositions
and Discovery §§ 15 to 20.
C.J.S. — 26A C.J.S. Depositions §§ 17 to 19.
A.L.R. — Disqualification of attorney, otherwise qualified, to take oath or acknowledgment
from client. 21 A.L.R.3d 483.
Use, in federal criminal prosecution, of depo-

sition of absent witness taken in foreign country, as affected by Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 15(b) and (d) requiring presence of
accused and that deposition be taken in manner provided in civil actions, 105 A X i t Fed.
537.
Key Numbers. — Depositions *=» 49, 50, 53.

Rule 29, Stipulations regarding discovery procedure.
Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties may by written stipulation
(1) provide that depositions may be taken before any person, at any
time or place, upon any notice, and in any manner and when so taken
may be used like other depositions, and
(2) modify the procedures provided by these rules for other methods of
discovery.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 29, F.R.C.P.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions
and Discovery § 11.
C.J.S. — 26A CJ.S. Depositions § 105.
A.L.R. — Incompetency, taking deposition
or serving interrogatories in civil case as
waiver of, 23 A.L.R.3d 389.

Videotape, use to take deposition for presentation at civil trial in state court, 66 A.L.R.3d
637.
Key Numbers. — Depositions ^» 111.

Rule 30. Depositions upon oral examination.
(a) When depositions may be taken. After commencement of the action,
any party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination. Leave of court, granted with or without notice,
must be obtained only if the plaintiff seeks to take a deposition prior to the
expiration of 30 days after service of the summons and complaint upon any
defendant or service made under Rule 4(e), except that leave is not required
(1) if a defendant has served a notice of taking deposition or otherwise sought
discovery, or (2) if special notice is given as provided in Subdivision (b)(2) of
this rule. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by subpoena as provided in Rule 45. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken
only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.
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(b) Notice of e x a m i n a t i o n ; g e n e r a l r e q u i r e m e n t s ; s p e c i a l notice; nons t e n o g r a p h i c r e c o r d i n g ; p r o d u c t i o n of d o c u m e n t s a n d things; deposition of organization; d e p o s i t i o n b y telephone.
(1) A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon oral
examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to every other party
to the action. The notice shall state the time and place for taking the
deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined, if
known, and, if the name is not known, a general description sufficient to
identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs. If a
subpoena duces tecum is to be served on the person to be examined, the
designation of the materials to be produced as set forth in the subpoena
shall be attached to or included in the notice.
(2) Leave of court is not required for the taking of a deposition by
plaintiff if the notice (A) states that the person to be examined is about to
go out of the district where the action is pending and more than 100 miles
from the place of trial, or is about to go out of the United States, or is
bound on a voyage to sea, and will be unavailable for examination unless
his deposition is taken before expiration of the 30-day period, and (B) sets
forth facts to support the statement. The plaintiffs attorney shall sign the
notice, and his signature constitutes a certification by him that to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief the statement and supporting
facts are true. The sanctions provided by Rule 11 are applicable to the
certification.
If a party shows that when he was served with notice under this Subdivision (b)(2) he was unable through the exercise of diligence to obtain
counsel to represent him at the taking of the deposition, the deposition
may not be used against him.
(3) The court may for cause shown enlarge or shorten the time for
taking the deposition.
(4) The parties may stipulate in writing or the court may upon motion
order that the testimony at a deposition be recorded by other than stenographic means. The stipulation or order shall designate the person before
whom the deposition shall be taken and the manner of recording, preserving, and filing the deposition and may include other provisions to assure
that the recorded testimony will be accurate and trustworthy. A party
may arrange to have a stenographic transcription made at his own expense. Any objections under Subdivision (c), any changes made by the
witness, his signature identifying the deposition as his own or the statement of the officer t h a t is required if the witness does not sign, as provided in Subdivision (e), and the certification of the officer required by
Subdivision (f) shall be set forth in a writing to accompany a deposition
recorded by nonstenographic means.
(5) The notice to a party deponent may be accompanied by a request
made in compliance with Rule 34 for the production of documents and
tangible things at the taking of the deposition. The procedure of Rule 34
shall apply to the request.
(6) A party may in his notice and in a subpoena name as the deponent a
public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, or a governmental agency and describe with reasonable particularity the matters on
which examination is requested. In that event, the organization so named
shall designate one or more officers, directors, managing agents, or other
persons who consent to testify on its behalf and may set forth, for each
person designated, the matters on which he will testify. A subpoena shall
advise a nonparty organization of its duty to make such a designation.
The persons so designated shall testify as to matters known or reasonably
available to the organization. This Subdivision (b)(6) does not preclude
taking a deposition by any other procedure authorized in these rules.
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(7) The parties may stipulate in writing or the court may upon motion
order that a deposition be taken by telephone. For the purposes of this
rule and Rules 28(a), 37(b)(1), and 45(d), a deposition taken by telephone
is taken at the place where the deponent is to answer questions propounded to him.
(c) E x a m i n a t i o n a n d c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n ; r e c o r d of examination; oath;
objections. Examination and cross-examination of witnesses may proceed as
permitted at the trial under the provisions of the U t a h Rules of Evidence. The
officer before whom the deposition is to be taken shall put the witnesses on
oath and shall personally or by someone acting under his direction and in his
presence record the testimony of the witness. The testimony shall be taken
stenographically or recorded by any other means ordered in accordance with
Subdivision (b)(4) of this rule. If requested by one of the parties, the testimony
shall be transcribed. All objections made at the time of the examination to the
qualifications of the officer taking the deposition, to the manner of taking it,
to the evidence presented, or to the conduct of any party and any other objection to the proceedings shall be noted by the officer upon the deposition.
Evidence objected to shall be taken subject to the objections. In lieu of participating in the oral examination, parties may serve written questions in a
sealed envelope on the party taking the deposition, and he shall transmit
them to the officer, who shall propound them to the witness and record the
answers verbatim.
(d) M o t i o n to t e r m i n a t e or limit e x a m i n a t i o n . At any time during the
taking of the deposition, on motion of a party or of the deponent and upon a
showing t h a t the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such
manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or
party, the court in which the action is pending or the court in the district
where the deposition is being taken may order the officer conducting the
examination to cease forthwith from taking the deposition, or may limit the
scope and manner of the taking of the deposition as provided in Rule 26(c). If
the order made terminates the examination, it shall be resumed thereafter
only upon the order of the court in which the action is pending. Upon demand
of the objecting party or deponent, the taking of the deposition shall be suspended for the time necessary to make a motion for an order. The provisions of
Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
(e) S u b m i s s i o n to witness; c h a n g e s ; s i g n i n g . When the testimony is
fully transcribed the deposition shall be submitted to the witness for examination and shall be read to or by him, unless such examination and reading are
waived by the witness and by the parties. Any changes in form or substance
which the witness desires to make shall be entered upon the deposition by the
officer with a statement of the reasons given by the witness for making them.
The deposition shall then be signed by the witness, unless the parties by
stipulation waive the signing or the witness is ill or cannot be found or refuses
to sign. If the deposition is not signed by the witness within 30 days of its
submission to him, the officer shall sign it and state on the record the fact of
the waiver or of the illness or absence of the witness or the fact of the refusal
to sign together with the reason, if any, given therefore; and the deposition
may then be used as fully as though signed unless on a motion to suppress
under Rule 32(c)(4) the court holds t h a t the reasons given for the refasal to
sign require rejection of the deposition in whole or in part.
(f) R e c o r d of deposition; certification a n d delivery b y officer; exhibits; c o p i e s .
(1) The transcript or other recording of the deposition made in accordance with this rule shall be the record of the deposition. The officer shall
sign a certificate, to accompany the record of the deposition, that it was
duly sworn and t h a t it is a true record of the testimony given by the
witness. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the officer shall securely
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seal the record of the deposition in an envelope endorsed with the title of
the action and marked "Deposition of [here insert name of witness]" and
shall promptly send the sealed record of the deposition to the attorney
who arranged for the transcript or other record to be made. If any party in
the action is not represented by an attorney, the record of the deposition
shall be sent to the clerk of the court for filing unless otherwise ordered
by the court. An attorney receiving the record of the deposition shall store
it under conditions that will protect it against loss, destruction, tampering, or deterioration.
(2) Documents and things produced for inspection during the examination of the witness shall, upon the request of a party, be marked for
identification and annexed to the record of the deposition and may be
inspected and copied by any party, except that if the person producing the
materials desires to retain them that person may (A) offer copies to be
marked for identification and annexed to the record of the deposition and
to serve thereafter as originals, if the person affords to all parties fair
opportunity to verify the copies by comparison with the originals, or (B)
offer the originals to be marked for identification, after giving to each
party an opportunity to inspect and copy them, in which event the originals may be used in the same manner as if annexed to the record of the
deposition. Any party may move for an order that the originals be annexed to and returned with the record of the deposition to the court,
pending final disposition of the case.
(3) Unless otherwise ordered by the court or agreed by the parties, the
officer shall retain stenographic notes of any depositions taken stenographically or a copy of the recording of any deposition taken by another
method. Upon payment of reasonable charges therefor, the officer shall
furnish a copy of the record of the deposition to any party or to the deponent.
(g) Failure to attend or to serve subpoena; expenses.
(1) If the party giving the notice of the taking of a deposition fails to
attend and proceed therewith and another party attends in person or by
attorney pursuant to the notice, the court may order the party giving the
notice to pay to such other party the reasonable expenses incurred by him
and his attorney in attending, including reasonable attorney's fees.
(2) If the party giving the notice of the taking of a deposition of a
witness fails to serve a subpoena upon him and the witness because of
such failure does not attend, and if another party attends in person or by
attorney because he expects the deposition of that witness to be taken, the
court may order the party giving the notice to pay to such other party the
reasonable expenses incurred by him and his attorney in attending, including reasonable attorney's fees.
(Amended effective January 1, 1995.)
Advisory Committee Note. — The principal purpose of the 1994 revisions to paragraph
(f) is to harmonize this rule with the Code of
Judicial Administration and the practice in the
courta relating to the riling of deposition transcripts. Under the revised rule, the officer before whom the deposition is taken must send
the sealed record of the deposition to the attorney who arranged for the record to the made,
instead of filing it with the court. If any of the
parties to the case is not represented by an
attorney, the record must be sent to the clerk of
the court in which the case is pending. In all
cases, the court may direct the parties and the
officer to make other arrangements for the
3afe-keeping of the deposition record.
„A />f fhe 1994 revisions is to

clarify the terminology used to designate the
record of deposition testimony. The word
"record" replaces the word "deposition" and includes transcripts. Since testimony may be recorded by written transcript, video-tape and
possibly other means allowed by the court, the
word "record** generally refers to any such
record of deposition testimony.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective January 1, 1995, corrected the
citation near the end of Subdivision (e) and rewrote Subdivision (f).
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds
to Rule 30, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Commencement of
action, U.R.C.P. 3.
Court reporters and stenographers, § 78-561.1 et seq.
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Depositions before action or pending appeal,
U.R.C.P. 27.
Filing with the court defined, U.R.C.P. 5(e).
Motions, orders and other papers, U.R.C.P.
7(b).
Partnership defined, § 48-1-3.
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Protective orders, U.R.C.P. 26(c).
Scope of cross-examination, UJl.E. 611(b).
Stipulations regarding discovery procedure,
U.R.C.P. 29.
Transcript of testimony at trial or hearing as
evidence, U.R.C.P. 80(c).
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Rule 31. Depositi

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALY8IS

Authentication.
—Objection.
Changes to deposition.
Compelling appearance.
Privilege against self-mcrimination.
Sealed depositions.
When taken.
—Action to remove city officer.
—Criminal actions.
Authentication.
—Objection.
Objection to deposition based on insufficiency of authentication by officer taking it
must be made by motion to suppress before
trial of cause. Groot v. Oregon Short Line R.R.,
34 Utah 152, 96 P. 1019 (1908).
Changes to deposition.
Although changes in depositions may be liberally allowed, the technical requirements of
Subdivision (e) that the deponent provide reasons for the changes must be strictly applied.
However, striking the changes is an extreme
remedy and should be used sparingly. A court
may instead permit the deponent opportunity
to comply. Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).
Compelling appearance.
To obtain presence of witness for purpose of
taking his deposition, notice and affidavit prescribed by former rule had to be served on adverse party a attorney; if witness did not voluntarily appear, officer before whom deposition
was to be taken had to issue subpoena. Command to witness to appear contained in notice
or affidavit was ineffective. Olson v. District
Court, 93 Utah 145, 71 P.2d 529, 112 A.L.R.
438 (1937).
Privilege against self-incrimiiiation.
Privilege against self-incrimination may be

asserted in civil discovery proceedings, including the taking of depositions; however, to sustain an assertion of the privilege, a party must
show that the responses sought to be compelled
might be incriminating. First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah
1984).
Sealed depositions.
The sealing provision of Subdivision (f)(1) is
not a mandate for secrecy, but rather is to safeguard the integrity of depositions. Carter v.
Utah Power & Light Co., 800 P.2d 1095 (Utah
1990).
Sealed pretrial depositions that are filed
with a court are presumptively public under
the Utah Public and Private Writings Act (former § 78-26-1 et seq.; see now Title S3, Chapter 2) absent a showing of good cause as to why
they should be kept secret. Carter v. Utah
Power & Light Co., 800 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1990).
When taken,
—Action to remove city officer.
Action to remove city commissioner for malfeasance in office is special statutory action to
which Rules of Civil Procedure apply and taking of depositions is permitted; where court rejected commissioner's request to take depositions of witnesses, because he had been furnished full information, his case was not significantly prejudiced. State v. Geurts, 11 Utah 2d
345, 359 P.2d 12 (1961).
—Criminal actions.
Application of this rule to criminal cases
would violate a defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination and his right to remain silent; civil procedures for discovery or inspection of evidence in possession of adverse party
do not apply in criminal cases. State v. Nielson, 522 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees in
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. JUT. 2d Depositions
and Discovery §5 130 to 167.
C.J.S. — 26A C J.S. Depositions §§ 8, 51 et
seq., 64, 65, 69, 70, 71, 73 et seq.
A.L.R. — Party's right to use, as evidence in
civil trial, his own testimony given upon interrogatories or depositions taken by opponent, 13
A.L.R.3d 1312.
Incompetency, taking deposition or serving
interrogatories in civil case as waiver of, 23
A.L.R.3d 389.
Self-incrimination, privilege against, as
ground for refusal to produce noncorporate documents in possession of person asserting privilege but owned by another, 37 A.L.R.3d 1373.

Right of member, officer, agent, or director of
private corporation or unincorporated association to assert personal privilege against self-incrimination with respect to production of corporate books or records, 52 AJL.R.3d 636; 87
A.L.R. Fed. 177.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R3d 303.
Tort or statutory liability for failure or refusal of witness to give testimony, 61 AL.R.3d
1297.
Videotape, use to take deposition for presentation at civil trial in state court, 66 A-L.R.3d
637.
Permissibility and standards for use of audio
recording to take deposition in state civil case,
13 A.L.R.4th 775.
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Amendment privilege against self-mcrimination to resist production of corporation's books
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Key Number*. — Depositions *» 17, 56 et
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(a) Serving questions; notice. After commencement of the action, any
party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition
upon written questions. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the
use of a subpoena as provided by Rule 45 The deposition of a person confined
m prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court
prescribes.
A party desiring to take a deposition upon written questions shall serve
them upon every other party with a notice stating (1) the name and address of
the person who is to answer them, if known, and if the name is not known, a
general description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group
to which he belongs, and (2) the name or descriptive title and address of the
officer before whom the deposition is to be taken. A deposition upon written
questions may be taken of a public or private corporation or a partnership or
association or governmental agency in accordance with the provisions of Rule
30(b)(6).
Within 30 days after the notice and written questions are served, a party
may serve cross questions upon all other parties. Within 10 days after being
served with cross questions, a party may serve redirect questions upon all
other parties. Within 10 days after being served with redirect questions, a
party may serve recross questions upon all other parties The court may for
cause shown enlarge or shorten the time.
(b) Officer to take responses and prepare record. A copy of the notice
and copies of all questions served shall be delivered by the party taking the
deposition to the officer designated in the notice, who shall proceed promptly,
m the manner provided by Rule 30(c), (e), and (f), to take the testimony of the
witness in response to the questions and to prepare, certify, and file or mail
the deposition, attaching thereto the copy of the notice and the questions
received by him.
(c) Notice of filing. When the deposition is filed the party taking it shall
promptly give notice thereof to all other parties.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds
to Rule 31, F R C P
Cross-References.
Commencement of
action, U R C P 3.
Filing with the court defined, U R C P 5(e).
Interrogatories to parties, U R C P 33
Partnership defined, § 48-1-3

Persons before whom depositions may be
taken, U R C P 28
Service of notice, U R C P 5
Stipulations regarding discovery procedure,
U R C P 29
Use of depositions in court proceedings,
URC.P 32

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Officer taking deposition
—Determination of objections.
Officer taking deposition.
—Determination of objections.
Officer before whom deposition was taken
had no power to pass upon relevancy, materiality competency or other ground of admissibility such questions were for court when deposi-

tion or part of it was offered as evidence Clayton v Ogden State Bank, 82 Utah 564, 26 P 2d
545 (1933)
Person taking deposition could not advise
witness whether to answer question, he was to
note objection and leave determination of questions to court. Moormeister v. Golding, 84 Utah
324, 27 P2d 447 (1933), affd on rehearing, 84
Utah 345, 35 P 2d 307 (1934)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r 2d. — 23 Am Jur 2d Depositions
and Discovery §§ 168 to 173
CJ'.S. — 26A C J S Depositions §§ 47 et
3eq, 65, 80
A.L.R. — Disqualification of attorney, other-

wise qualified, to take oath or acknowledgment
from client, 21 AJLR3d 483
Tort or statutory liability for failure or refusal of witness to give testimony, 61 A L R 3d
1297

Tab 10

Rule 45

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

114

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 — Part IE, 1995 Utah L. Rev. 683.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence
§ 258; 29A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 1324 et
seq.;,61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 12 to 14.
C J . S . — 32A C.J.S. Evidence §§ 813 et seq.,
1040; 71 C.J.S. Pleading § 86.
AJLR. — Federal Civil Procedure Rule

44(a)(1), sufficiency of authentication of copy of
domestic official record, 2 AJLK Fed. 306.
Admissibility, under Rule 803(10) of Federal
Rules of Evidence, of evidence of absence of
public record or entry, 70 A.L.R. Fed. 198.
Key Numbers. — Evidence «= 325 to 349;
Pleading *» 63.

Rule 45. Subpoena,
(a) Form; issuance.
(1) Every subpoena shall:
(A) issue from the court in which the action is pending;
(B) state the title of the action, the name of the court from which it
is issued, the name and address of the party or attorney serving the
subpoena, and its civil action number;
(C) command each person to whom it is directed to appear to give
testimony at trial, or at hearing, or at deposition, or to produce or to
permit inspection and copying of documents or tangible things in the
possession, custody or control of that person, or to permit inspection
of premises, at a time and place therein specified; and
(D) set forth the text of Notice to Persons Served with a Subpoena,
in substantially similar form to Form 30 in the Appendix of Forms to
these rules.
(2) A command to produce or to permit inspection and copying of documents or tangible things, or to permit inspection of premises, may be
joined with a command to appear at trial, or at hearing, or at deposition,
or may be issued separately.
(3) The clerk shall issue a subpoena, signed but otherwise in blank, to a
party requesting it, who shall complete it before service. An attorney
admitted to practice in the court in which the action is pending may also
issue and sign a subpoena as an officer of the court.
(b) Service; scope.
(1) Generally.
(A) A subpoena may be served by any person who is not a party
and is not less than 18 years of age. Service of a subpoena upon a
person named therein shall be made as provided in Rule 4(e) for the
service of process and, if the person's appearance is commanded, by
tendering to that person the fees for one day's attendance and the
mileage allowed by law. When the subpoena is issued on behalf of the
United States, or this state, or any officer or agency of either, fees
and mileage need not be tendered. Prior notice of any commanded
production or inspection of documents or tangible things or inspection of premises before trial shall be served on each party in the
manner prescribed by Rule 5(b).
(B) Proof of service when necessary shall be made by filing with
the clerk of the court from which the subpoena is issued a statement
of the date and manner of service and of the names of the persons
served, certified by the person who made the service.
(C) Service of a subpoena outside of this state, for the taking of a
deposition or production or inspection of documents or tangible
things or inspection of premises outside this state, shall be made in
accordance with the requirements of the jurisdiction in which such
service ia made.
(2) Subpoena for appearance at trial or hearing. A subpoena commanding a witness to appear at a trial or at a hearing pending in this state may
be served at any place within the state.
(3) Subpoena for taking deposition.
(A) A person who resides in this state may be required to appear at
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deposition only in the county where the person resides, or is employed, or transacts business in person, or at such other place as the
court may order. A person who does not reside in this state may be
required to appear at deposition only in the county in this state
where the person is served with a subpoena, or at such other place as
the court may order.
(B) A subpoena commanding the appearance of a witness at a deposition may also command, the person to whom it is directed to
produce or to permit inspection and copying of documents or tangible
things relating to any of the matters within the scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26(b), but in that event the subpoena will be
subject to the provisions of Rule 30(b) and paragraph (c) of this rule.
(4) Subpoena for production or inspection of documents or tangible
things or inspection of premises. A subpoena to command a person who is
not a party to produce or to permit inspection and copying of documents or
tangible things or to permit inspection of premises may be served at any
time after commencement of the action. The scope and procedure shall
comply with Rule 34, except that the person must be allowed at least 14
days to comply as stated in subparagraph (c)(2)(A) of this rule. The party
serving the subpoena shall pay the reasonable cost of producing or copying the documents or tangible things. Upon the request of any other party
and the payment of reasonable costs, the party serving the subpoena shall
provide to the requesting party copies of all documents obtained in response to the subpoena,
(c) Protection of persons subject to subpoenas.
(1) A party or an attorney responsible for the issuance and service of a
subpoena shall take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or
expense on a person subject to that subpoena. The court from which the
subpoena was issued shall enforce this duty and impose upon the party or
attorney in breach of this duty an appropriate sanction, which may include, but is not limited to, lost earnings and a reasonable attorney's fee.
(2) (A) A subpoena served upon a person who is not a party to produce
or to permit inspection and copying of documents or tangible things
or to permit inspection of premises, whether or not joined with a
command to appear at trial, or at hearing, or at deposition, must
allow the person at least 14 days after service to comply, unless a
shorter time has been ordered by the court for good cause shown.
_ (B) A person commanded to produce or to permit inspection and
copying of documents or tangible things or to permit inspection of
premises need not appear in person at the place of production or
inspection unless also commanded to appear at trial, at hearing, or at
deposition.
(C) A person commanded to produce or to permit inspection and
copying of documents or tangible things or inspection of premises
may, before the time specified for compliance with the subpoena,
serve upon the party or attorney designated in the subpoena written
objection to inspection or copying of any or all of the documents or
tangible things or inspection of the premises. If objection is made, the
party serving the subpoena shall not be entitled to inspect and copy
the materials or inspect the premises except pursuant to an order of
the court. If objection has been made, the party serving the subpoena
may, upon notice to the person commanded to produce, move at any
time for an order to compel the production. Such an order to compel
production shall protect any person who is not a party or an officer of
' a party from significant expense resulting from the inspection and
copying commanded.
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(3) (A) On timely motion, the court from which a subpoena was issued
shall quash or modify the subpoena if it:
(i) fails to allow reasonable time for compliance;
(ii) requires a resident of this state who is not a party to appear at deposition in a county in which the resident does not
reside, or is not employed, or does not transact business in person; or requires a non-resident of this state to appear at deposition in a county other than the county in which the person was
served;
(iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter
and no exception or waiver applies;
(iv) subjects a person to undue burden.
(B) If a subpoena:
(i) requires disclosure of a trade secret or other confidential
research, development, or commercial information;
(ii) requires disclosure of an unretained expert's opinion or
information not describing specific events or occurrences in dispute and resulting from the expert's study made not at the request of any party;
(iii) requires a resident of this state who is not a party to
appear at deposition in a county in which the resident does not
reside, or is not employed, or does not transact business in person; or
(iv) requires a non-resident of this state who is not a party to
appear at deposition in a county other than the county in which
the person was served;
the court may, to protect a person subject to or affected by the subpoena, quash or modify the subpoena or, if the party serving the
subpoena shows a substantial need for the testimony or material that
cannot otherwise be met without undue hardship and assures that
the person to whom the subpoena is addressed will be reasonably
compensated, the court may order appearance or production only
upon specified conditions.
(d) Duties in responding to subpoena.
(1) A person responding to a subpoena to produce documents shall produce them as they are kept in the usual course of business or shall organize and label them to correspond with the categories in the demand.
(2) When information subject to a subpoena is withheld on a claim that
it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation materials, the
claim shall be made expressly and shall be supported by a description of
the nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced that
is sufficient to enable the demanding party to contest the claim.
(e) C o n t e m p t Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a
subpoena served upon that person may be deemed a contempt of the court
from which the subpoena issued. An adequate cause for failure to obey exists
when a subpoena purports to require a nonparty to appear or produce at a
place not within the limits provided by subparagraph (c)(3)(A)(ii).
(f) Procedure where witness conceals himself or fails to attend. If a
witness evades service of a subpoena, or fails to attend after service of a
subpoena, the court may issue a warrant to the sheriff of the county to arrest
the witness and bring the witness before the court.
(g) Procedure when witness is confined in jail. If the witness is a prisoner confined in a jail or prison within the state, an order for examination in
the prison upon deposition or, in the discretion of the court, for temporary
removal and production before the court or officer for the purpose of being
orally examined, may be made upon motion, with or without notice, by a
justice of the Supreme Court, or by the district court of the county in which
the action is pending.
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(h> Subpoena unnecessary; when. A person present in court, or before a
judicial officer, may be required to testify in the same manner as if the person
were in attendance upon a subpoena.
i Amended effective January 1, 1995.)
Advisory C o m m i t t e e Note. — Purposes of
Amendment. The 1994 amendments represent
a substantial change from prior practice. Patterned on the 1991 amendments to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 45, these amendments expedite and facilitate procedures for serving subpoenas, modify
procedures relating to persons who are not parties to correspond to procedures relating to parties under Utah R. Civ. P. 34, and specify the
nghia and obligations of persons served with a
subpoena.
Paragraph (a). Thi3 paragraph amends former Rule 45 in the following important respects:
Firat, subparagraph (a)(6)(3) authorizes an
attorney to issue and sign a subpoena as an
officer of the court. The subparagraph eliminates the requirement that an attorney obtain
a subpoena from the clerk of the court, and the
requirement that a subpoena be issued under
seal of the court. An attorney who is not a
member of the Utah State Bar but who has
been admitted to practice pro hac vice in the
court in which the action is pending is authorized to issue a subpoena. Consistent with the
authority of an attorney to issue a subpoena,
subparagraph (a)(1)(B) requires every subpoena to identify the attorney serving it. Subparagraph (a)(1)(A) requires every subpoena to
issue from the court in which the action is
pending, amending former Rule 45(d)(1), which
authorized a deposition to be issued from the
court where the deposition is to take place, as
well as the court where the action is pending.
Second, subparagraph (a)(2) authorizes a
party to 3erve upon a person who is not a party
a 3ubpoena to produce or to permit inspection
and copying of documents or tangible things, or
to permit inspection of premises. A party no
longer must serve a subpoena duces tecum to
discover documents or tangible things from a
person who is not a party, although the
amended rule preserves that option, and no
longer must bring an independent action for
entry onto land. Subparagraph (a)(2) also requires a person who is not a party to produce
materials within that person's control, which
subjects that person to the 3ame 3cope of discovery as if that person were a party served
with a discovery request under Rule 34.
Third, subparagraph (a)(1)(D) requires even'
subpoena to state the rights and duties of a
person served in a form substantially similar
to the form in the Appendix to these rules.
Paragraph (b) also amends former Rule 45
in several important respects. Subparagraph
fb)(l)(A) requires prior notice of each commanded production or inspection of documents
or tangible things, or inspection of premises, to
be 3erved as prescribed by Rule 5(bj. This subparagraph ensures that other parties will have
notice enabling them to object to or participate
in discovery, or to serve a demand for additional materials. No similar provision is included for depositions, because depositions are

governed by Rule 30 or 31. Subparagraph
(bKl(A) specifies that the subpoena may be
served as required by Rule 4(e), amending
paragraph (c) of the former rule.
Subparagraph (b)(4) authorizes a subpoena
for production or inspection of documents or
tangible things or inspection of premises to be
served upon a person who is not a party at any
time after commencement of the action. A subpoena served upon a person who is not a party
has the same scope specified in Rule 34(a) for a
request served upon a party, and is 3ubject to
the same procedures specified in Rule 34(b). A
person who is not a party is not required to file
a written response to the subpoena, unless the
party objects to the subpoena pursuant to subparagraph (c)(2)(D).
Subparagraph (b)(4) also requires each party
serving a 3ubpoena for the production of documents to provide to other parties copies of documents obtained in response to the subpoena.
No comparable provision appears in the federal
rule, but the Committee determined that such
a provision would alleviate some of the burden
imposed upon persons who are not parties and
shift it to parties.
Other subparagraphs make minor amendments to the former Rule 45. Subparagraph
(b)(1)(C) amends former paragraph (d)(3) to include a subpoena for document production or
inspection, as well as a deposition subpoena.
Subparagraph (b)(2) is the former paragraph
(e) with minor modifications. Subparagraph
(b)(3)(A) requires a nonresident to attend deposition only in the county where the nonresident
is 3erved, amending former paragraph (d)(2) to
eliminate the requirement that a nonresident
attend a deposition within forty miles of the
place of service.
Paragraph (c). Paragraph (c) states the
rights of witnesses or other persons served
with subpoenas. The paragraph does not diminish rights conferred by any other rule or
any other authority. Subparagraph (c)(1) states
the duty ot an attorney to minimize the burden
on a witness who is not a party, and specifies
that such a witness may recover lost earnings
that result from the misuse of a subpoena. Subparagraph 'c;(D expands the responsibility of
an attorney stated in Rule 26(g); this responsibility is correlative to the expanded power of
an attorney to issue a 3ubpoena.
Subparagraph (c)(2)(A) specifies that a person who is not a party served with a subpoena
for the production or inspection of documents
or tangible things or inspection of premises
must have at least 14 days to respond. A subpoena to appear at trial, at hearing, or at deposition must be 3erved within a reasonable time,
unless it also requires the production of documents.
Subparagraph (c)(2)(C) 3tates that a person
who is not a party has no obligation to make
copies or to advance costs, and has no counterpart in either the federal rule or the former
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state rule. The Committee included this statement in the rule so that it would become part
of the notice provided to each person served
with a subpoena.
Subparagraph (c)(2)(D) specifies that a person served with a subpoena for the production
or inspection of documents or tangible things
or inspection of premises may serve written objection upon the party serving the subpoena.
The party serving the subpoena bears the burden to obtain an order to compel production,
and must provide prior notice to the person
served of the motion to compel. A person
served with a subpoena to appear at trial, at
hearing, or at deposition, must appear unless
the person obtains a court order to quash or
modify the subpoena; a written objection to the
serving party is insufficient. A person served
with a subpoena duces tecum may object to
providing documents by notifying the party
serving the subpoena, but still must appear to
testify at trial, at hearing, or at deposition, unless the person obtains an order to quash or
modify the subpoena.
Subparagraph (c)(3) identifies the circumstances in which a subpoena may be modified
or quashed. It follows paragraph (c)(3) of the
1991 amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, but is
modified to specify the locations where residents or nonresidents of the State may be compelled to attend deposition.
Paragraph (d). This paragraph follows the
1991 amendments to Fed R. Civ. P. 45. Subparagraph (d)(2)(D) applies to privileged attor-

ney-client communications, and to all attorney
work product protected under the doctrine of
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), and
progeny.
Paragraph (e). This paragraph specifies that
an adequate cause for failure to obey exists
when a subpoena purports to require a party to
respond at a place beyond the geographic
boundaries imposed by the rule, amending former paragraph (f).
Paragraph (f). This is the former paragraph
(g), amended to eliminate references to the
masculine pronoun.
Paragraph (g). This is the former paragraph
(h).
Paragraph (h). This is the former paragraph
(i), amended to eliminate references to the
masculine pronoun.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective January 1, 1995, rewrote former Subdivisions (a) to (f) as Subdivisions (a)
to (e) and made stylistic and designation
changes in Subdivisions (e) to (h).
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds
to Rule 45, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Civil penalty and
damages recoverable, § 78-24-7.
Contempt, § 78-32-1 et seq.
Definition of subpoena, § 78-24-5.
Duty of witness served with subpoena,
§ 78-24-6.
Fees and mileage of witnesses, § 21-5-4.
Municipality, rules may govern subpoena issued by, § 10-3-610.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Contempt.
—Refusal to give testimony.
Denial of witness fees.
Production of documentary evidence.
—Amount of material.
Service.
—Mileage and attendance fees.
Distance between home and court.
Several pending cases.
—Waiver.
Effect on witness.
Taking of deposition.
—Command to appear in notice.
Cited.
Contempt
—Refusal to give testimony.
Denial of w i t n e s s fees.
Litigants who were before court and who
were personally ordered to appear before notary and give testimony for depositions, but
who refused to obey because witness and mileage fees were denied them in advance, although seasonably requested, were guilty of
contempt, notwithstanding that court may
have erred in concluding that they were not
entitled to the fees. Crowther v. District Court,
93 Utah 586, 54 P.2d 243 (1936).
Production of d o c u m e n t a r y evidence.
—Amount of material.
Even though former law authorized the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, if the number

of books specified was so great as to be unreasonably burdensome to produce them all in
court or before the officer, the witness might
justify his failure to produce them, until such
time as he or others might be examined to determine which contained relevant matter.
Evans v. Evans, 98 Utah 189, 98 P.2d 703
(1940).
Service.
—Mileage and attendance fees.
Distance b e t w e e n home and court.
Mileage was allowed subpoenaed witness for
entire distance between home of witness and
place where court was held, or where he was
required to attend, and not merely from place
where he was served with subpoena. Holt v.
Nielson, 37 Utah 566, 109 P. 470 (1910).
Several pending cases.
Witnesses subpoenaed and in actual attendance in several cases at the instance of the
same plaintiff were entitled to their fees in
each case, though the suits were pending at the
same time and place. Smith v. Nelson, 23 Utah
512, 65 P. 485 (1901).
—Waiver.
Effect on witness.
Witness could waive strict compliance with
respect to service of subpoena and still be required to attend court, and be entitled to mileage fees from home to place of trial. Holt v.
Nielson, 37 Utah 566, 109 P. 470 (1910).
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Taking of deposition.
—Command to appear in notice.
To obtain presence of witness for purpose of
taking his deposition, notice and affidavit prescribed by former statute had to be served on
adverse party's attorney, and then if witness
would not voluntarily appear, the officer before
whom the deposition was to be taken had to

Rule 46

issue subpoena for his appearance; a command
to witness to appear contained in notice or affidavit would be ineffective. Olson v. District
Court, 93 Utah 145, 71 P.2d 529, 112 A.L.R.
438 (1937).
Cited in Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165
(Utah 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses
§§ 5, 7, 9 to 22.
C.J.S. — 97 CJ.S. Witnesses §§ 19 to 34, 45.
A.L.R. — Privilege against self-mcrimination as ground for refusal to produce noncorporate documents in possession of person asserting privilege but owned by another, 37
AL.R.3d 1373.
Right of independent expert to refuse to testify as to expert opinion, 50 A-L.R4th 680.
Compelling testimony of opponent's expert
in state court, 66 A.L.R.4th 213.
Adverse presumption or inference based on
state's failure to produce or examine law en-

forcement personnel — modern cases, 81
AX.R.4th 872.
Adverse presumption or inference based on
party's failure to produce or examine transferor, transferee, broker, or other person allegedly involved in transaction at issue — modern
cases, 81 A-LJUth 939.
Requirements, under Rule 45(c) of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 17(d) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, relating to
service of subpoena and tender of witness fees
and mileage allowance, 77 A. L i t Fed. 863.
Key Numbers. — Witnesses *=» 7 to 22, 33.

Rule 46. Exceptions unnecessary.
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is
sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or
sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to
take or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor; and, if
a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made,
the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice him.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially similar to Rule 46, F.R.CJP.

Cross-References. — Objections to instructions to jury, U.R.C.P. 51.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Form of verdict.
—Duty to examine and object
In general.
Instructions.
—Right to object.
Harmless error.
Cited.
Form of verdict
—Duty to examine and object
Counsel has the obligation not only to object
to the form of the verdict, but to affirmatively
3eek to examine it; by failing to request court
permission to examine the verdict and make
objection to it, party waived any objection to
the verdict form. Martineau v. Anderson, 636
P.2d 1039 (Utah 1981).
In general.
To preserve a question for appeal, an objection must be clear and concise and made in a

fashion calculated to obtain a ruling thereon.
Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah Ct. App.
1989), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).
Instructions.
—Right to object
The parties have a right to make objections
to the instructions to preserve challenges to
their accuracy; if counsel was prevented from
making objections to instructions, he should,
under this rule, be deemed to have done so.
Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d
564 (1960).
Harmless error.
If the instructions are correct, any error
which prevents counselfrommaking objections
thereto ia harmless error. Hanks v.
Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564
(1960).
Cited in Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455
(Utah 1981); Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
rict compliance with
oena and still be rei be entitled to mileace of trial. Holt v.
>9 P. 470 (1910).

Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate
Review § 614.
CJ.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 202 et
aeq.
A.L.R. — Sufficiency in federal court of mo-

tion in limine to preserve for appeal objection
to evidence absent contemporary objection at
trial, 76 A.Lit Fed. 619.
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error •» 169
et seq., 248.

Tab 11

Art. I, $ 14

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of
warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing
to be seized.
History: C o n s t 1896.
Cross-References, — Controlled Substances Act search warrants, § 58-37-10

Liquor search,
5 32A-13-103

seizure

and

forfeiture

NOTES TO DECISIONS
A>AJLYSIS

In general.
Administrative inspections and searches.
Automobile search
—Inventory
Blood samples
City ordinance
Consent to search
—Who may consent
Drugs
Evidence voluntarily surrendered.
Exclusionary rule
Hair samples
Information used to support warrant.
Invalid search warrant
Inventory search
Juveniles
Liquor
Neutral and detached magistrate.
Particular description
Plain view
P m a t e searches
Probable cause
—Veracity of witness
Reasonable expectation of privacy
Scope of search
Search
Search incident to arrest.
Search warrant
—Validity
Search without warrant
—Delay before search
—Propriety
Standing to object to search
—Stolen vehicle
Stopping for criminal in\estigation
Cited
In general.
Neither under a subpoena duces tecum nor
under a motion to examine will an examination be permitted of a nature to contravene
pro\ision against unreasonable searches and

seizures Evans v Evans, 98 Utah 189, 98 P 2d
703 (1940)
It is generally recognized that the legitimate
use of a search warrant is restricted to public
prosecutions, and in no event may such proceeding be invoked for the protection of a mere
private right Allen v Trueman, 100 Utah 36
110 P2d 355 (1941)
It is use to which it is put that renders property, otherwise lawful and rightful to have, use
and possess, subject to seizure and forfeiture
Hemenwav & Moser Co v Funk, 100 Utah 72
106 P2d 779 (1940)
For general discussion of fourth amendment
to federal Constitution, see Citv of Price v
Jaynes, 113 Utah 89, 191 P 2d "606 (1948)
Whether a search and seizure is reasonable
is to be determined by the trial court, and evidence in plain view of the officer pursuing a
felon may be rightfully seized and such seizure
is not a violation of the federal constitutional
protection as set forth in Mapp v Ohio, 367
U S 643, 81 S Ct 1684, 6 L Ed 2d 1081
(1961) State v Allred, 16 Utah 41, 395 P 2d
535 11964)
No illegal search and seizure occurred where
police went to defendant's apartment pursuant
to a tip, were voluntarily admitted by another
defendant, saw articles taken in burglary in
plain sight on kitchen table and were shown
other stolen merchandise willingly by defendant State v Kaae, 30 Utah 2d 73, 513 P2d
435 (1973).
Where, although investigation was in its
preliminary stages, police officers realized
there was a possibility that defendant had committed rape and homicide that they were investigating, and feared that he might try to escape
or obtain a weapon if he got out of their sight
their conduct in accompanying him into his
bedroom while he finished dressing and in observing shirt with long strands of hair resembling that of the victim which shirt and hair
were in plain sight, did not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure, nor was taking
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defendant's clothes after he was arrested and
subjecting them to scientific scrutiny, an unreasonable search and seizure State v Sims,
30 Utah 2d 251, 516 P 2d 354 (1973), cert denied, 417 U S 970, 94 S Ct 3175, 41 L Ed 2d
1141 (1974)
Administrative inspections and searches.
This section and the fourth amendment of
the federal constitution protect against warrantless administrative
inspections
and
searches of business establishments for purposes of enforcing the Utah Occupational
Health and Safety Act of 1973 State Indus
Comm'n v Wasatch Metal & Salvage Co , 594
P 2d 894 (Utah 1979)
Automobile search.
Evidence taken from automobile defendant
was driving and subsequently used to convict
him of burglary and grand larceny did not violate constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures, even though
taking was not connected with cause of arrest
and was done without search warrant in view
of facts that car was lawfully taken into possession and impounded when defendant was arrested for driving automobile which did not belong to him and without valid driver's license
and since, under such circumstances, it was responsibility of police impounding car to take
inventory of its contents State v Criscola, 21
Utah 2d 272, 444 P 2d 517 (1968)
Defendant charged with possession of stolen
money orders, which were found in the car of
another person, was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing which would afford him an opportunity to challenge the search and seizure
United States v Smith, 495 F 2d 668 (10th Cir
1972)
Examination of exterior of automobile
parked in plain sight at motel did not constitute such violation of privacy as to violate this
section State v Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 495
P 2d 1259 (1972)
Where accused sold his car voluntarily
through the agency of another to a part-time
deputy sheriff, evidence from subsequent
search was admissible State v Redford, 27
Utah 2d 379, 496 P 2d 884 (1972)
Officer, who received radio notification that
service station in vicinity had just been robbed
and that the felon was observed running in a
northwesterly direction from the service station, was justified in stopping automobile in
well-lighted intersection approximately three
blocks northwest of service station and in arresting defendant who closely fitted description
of fleeing felon, money found on floor of automobile subsequent to defendants arrest was
the product of a search incident to a lawful
arrest State v Torres, 29 L t a h 2d 269, 508
P 2 d 534 (1973)
A warrantless search was not unreasonable

Art. I, § 14

where officer stopped a van traveling upon the
road that matched the description of one seen
at the scene of the crime and conducted the
search of the van after having asked and received permission from the driver to do so
State v Angus, 581 P 2d 992 (Utah 1978)
Warrantless seizure of stolen property,
which was in plain view of the police officers as
they first approached the car during an investigatory stop and which was subsequently identified by the true owner, from the back seat of
the car after the occupants had been arrested
and the car impounded was not unreasonable
State v Ballenberger, 652 P 2d 927 (Utah
1982)
Warrantless search of defendant's automobile and the seizure of a sawed-off shotgun
found under the front seat were reasonable and
therefore lawful under the open view doctrine,
as well as being incident to a lawful arrest,
where police officers made a valid warrantless
arrest of defendant near his automobile for violating his parole conditions and attempted
flight to avoid arrest, the arresting officer observed through an open door shotgun shells lying between the automobile seats, and there
were other suspects loose in the area and shots
were being fired, under such circumstances, it
was reasonable and lawful for the arresting officer to search under the front seat, where he
found the sawed off shotgun, to prevent the defendant or others from getting their h a n d s on
weapons State v Kent, 665 P 2d 1317 (Utah
1983)
Police are not authorized to stop northbound
vehicles simph because they contain "Latinappeanng" occupants and display suspect state
license plates a contrary holding would substantially interfere with those travelers' protection from unreasonable searches and seizures State v Mendoza, 748 P 2d 181 (Utah
1987)
Defendant who was simply a passenger who
happened to be taking his t u r n driving when
the car was pulled over had no standing to
challenge the search of the car State v DeAlo,
748 P 2 d 194 (Ltah Ct App 1987)
Opening a car door to inspect the vehicle
identification number was an unreasonable
search, where the car was found parked on a
street and police officers could h a \ e easily obtained a warrant for a search of it State v
Larocco, 135 Ltah Adv Rep 16 a 9 9 0 )
—Inventory.
The state fails to meet its burden of establishing the necessity for a warrantless inventory search of the vehicle of an arrested person
in the face of evidence that the arrestee was
given no opportunity to arrange for disposition
of his own car State v Hygh 711 P 2d 264
i Ltah 1985)
The search of an impounded vehicle of an
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arrested person is not a valid inventory search
where the police department, in conducting the
inventor)' search, fails to follow a regularized
set of procedures which are drafted to guard
against arbitrariness by an officer in the field.
State v. Hygh. 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985).
Blood s a m p l e s .
The taking of defendant's blood sample without a warrant did not constitute an unconstitutional search and seizure where after defendant's arrest on a warrant, the state filed a
motion to compel discovery of body fluids, defendant and his counsel were notified, an adversary hearing was held, and the magistrate
ordered the taking of the blood sample. State v.
Easthope, 668 P.2d 528 (Utah 1983).
City o r d i n a n c e .
City ordinance allegedly enacted pursuant to
powers granted by § 10-8-50, providing that
right of people of city "to be secure in their
persons, bouses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated," and making violation thereof misdemeanor, was void for vagueness and uncertainty in failing to define or prescribe standards to determine what acts constitute unreasonable searches or seizures. City of Price v.
Jaynes, 113 Utah 89, 191 P.2d 606 (1948).
C o n s e n t to s e a r c h .
Prosecution has the burden of establishing
from the totality of the circumstances that the
consent to search was voluntarily given; factors which may show a lack of duress or coercion in obtaining the consent include: the absence of a claim of authority to search by the
officers; the absence of an exhibition of force by
the officers; a mere request to search; cooperation by the owner of the object to be searched;
and the absence of deception or trick on the
part of the officers. State v. Whittenback, 621
P.2d 103 (Utah 1980 L
—Who may c o n s e n t
Search made with consent of defendant's
mother was not unlawful where defendant
lived at his mother's home and she had willingly agreed to the search and later testified
that she knew she could have refused to do so.
State v. Kelsey. 532 P.2d 1001 (Utah 1975).
Where defendant lived with his mother in
her house trailer, she could give consent to a
warrantless search of the trailer, and if the
state satisfied its burden of proof that from the
totality of the circumstances the consent of the
mother had been voluntarily given, evidence
obtained would be admissible. State v. Durand,
569 P.2d 1107 Utah 1977).
Drugs.
Marijuana taken during the search of defendant's home pursuant to warrant was unlawfully taken and evidence should have been sup-

pressed on defendant's motion because search
w a r r a n t was based on police officer's oral deposition rather than on oath or affirmation. State
v. Jasso, 21 Utah 2d 24, 439 P.2d 844 (1968i.
Marijuana had not been obtained by illegal
search and seizure where police officers had
driven over to plane, and through the open pilot's door had seen that the plane was tightly
stacked from floor to ceiling with plastic bundles which they recognized as marijuana. State
v. Simpson, 541 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1975).
There was no constitutionally prohibited
search by police officer where such officer,
without any warrant, acting upon reliable information that marijuana was being grown in
a house, walked up the driveway of the house
and observed in plain view growing marijuana
plants, and the officer then withdrew from the
premises keeping such under surveillance
until defendant came out and watered the
plants at which time the officer arrested defendant for committing a public offense in the officer's presence and confiscated the contraband
plants incident to the arrest. State v.
Echevarrieta, 621 P.2d 709 (Utah 1980).
Evidence voluntarily surrendered.
Evidence voluntarily surrendered to police
officer by codefendant after his arrest was not
a product of illegal search and seizure by virtue of allegedly illegal arrest where officer had
reasonable grounds for making the arrest.
State v. Bray, 30 Utah 2d 121, 514 P.2d 537
(1973).
E x c l u s i o n a r y rale.
The exclusionary rule does not require the
suppression of otherwise legally seized evidence merely because it was obtained in the
same search as evidence illegally seized; in
such case, only the illegally seized evidence
should be suppressed. State v. Romero, 660
P.2d 715 (Utah 1983).
Exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a
necessary consequence of police violations of
this section. State v. Larocco, 135 Utah Adv.
Rep. 16 (1990).
Hair samples.
The extraction of hair samples from defendant's head pursuant to an allegedly defective
search w a r r a n t did not violate defendant's constitutional rights since, generally, the simple
extraction of hair samples from the body of the
accused is so minimal and unintrusive as to be
a reasonable search, even absent a warrant for
the purpose. State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353
' U t a h 1980).
I n f o r m a t i o n used to s u p p o r t w a r r a n t .
Assuming warrantless search and seizure of
an envelope and its contents to be in violation
of the fourth amendment of the U.S. Constitution, use of testimony of a witness, which testimony related to the same subject matter of the

108

envelope, in affidavit
search warrant was
was sufficiently atten
the contents of the e
illegal search so as to
sality. State v. Romei
1981) (one justice cone
two justices dissenting
Invalid search wanFact that search w,
cause of failure of affn
facts to justify its issi
that search of defendan
to the warrant was ui
rant was valid on its
had been informed that
pated in burglary. St;
Utah 2d 435, 519 P.2c
Inventory search.
Warrantless search (
and the seizure of a com
therein did not violate
tional
protections
a
searches and seizures 1
the inventory search e:
warrant requirement wl
fendant for a speeding
defendant after discos
wanted on a fugitive wa
the officer removed a sui
automobile for purposes
opened the suitcase for f
inventory of its content
return to defendant after
the suitcase contained a
a loaded firearm; there \
the inventory of the suite
tive purposes; and the su
in the presence of defe
quested. State v. Crabtre
1980) (one justice concu
and two justices dissent
Juveniles.
Juvenile was entitled
protections against unrea
seizures. In re K.K.C., (
1981).
Liquor.
Where police officers
rooming house under cifr
mine if liquor was being s
etor during investigation
liquor and gave some to
seizure of the liquor by tl
Salt Lake City v. Wight,
900 (1922).
Unchallenged entry of
mission agents into club
would make unlawful sak
warrantless search and d
their purchase of an}

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
on because search
officer's oral depoaffirmation. State
9 P.2d 844 (1968).
btained by illegal
olice officers had
ough the open piplane was tightly
with plastic bunmarijuana. State
Utah 1975).
nally prohibited
»re such officer,
upon reliable in» being grown in
vay of the house
>wing marijuana
thdrew from the
er surveillance
id watered the
' arrested defence nse in the offithe contraband
•est. State v.
;tah 1980).
dered.
iered to police
arrest was not
seizure by virlere officer had
[g the arrest.
514 P.2d 537

>t require the
y seized evitained in the
lly seized; in
zed evidence
Romero, 660
evidence is a
violations of
5 Utah Adv.

from defenlly defective
ndant's conthe simple
body of the
live as to be
warrant for
>2 P.2d 353
arrant.
1 seizure of
n violation
. Constitu•hich testifier of the

envelope, in affidavit to support issuance of a
search warrant was proper where testimony
was sufficiently attenuated from the taint of
the contents of the envelope obtained by a n
illegal search so as to break the chain of causality. State v. Romero, 624 P.2d 699 (Utah
1981) (one justice concurring in the result and
two justices dissenting).
Invalid search w a r r a n t
Fact that search warrant was invalid because of failure of affidavit to state sufficient
facts to justify its issuance did not establish
that search of defendant's automobile p u r s u a n t
to the warrant was unreasonable since warrant was valid on its face and police officers
had been informed that defendant had participated in burglary. State v. Farnsworth, 30
Utah 2d 435, 519 P.2d 244 (1974).
Inventory search.
Warrantless search of defendant's suitcase
and the seizure of a controlled substance found
therein did not violate defendant's constitutional
protections
against
unreasonable
searches and seizures because it was within
the inventory search exception to the search
warrant requirement where officer stopped defendant for a speeding violation and arrested
defendant after discovering that he was
wanted on a fugitive warrant; after the arrest
the officer removed a suitcase from defendant's
automobile for purposes of safekeeping; officer
opened the suitcase for purposes of making an
inventory of its contents for safekeeping and
return to defendant after defendant stated t h a t
the suitcase contained a large sum of cash and
a loaded firearm; there was no allegation t h a t
the inventory of the suitcase was for investigative purposes; and the suitcase was inventoried
in the presence of defendant as he had requested. State v. Crabtree, 618 P.2d 484 (Utah
1980) (one justice concurring with comment
and two justices dissenting).
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DeFusion Co. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n,
613 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1980).
Neutral and detached magistrate.
Judge issuing a search w a r r a n t did not lose
his character as a neutral and detached magistrate where he went to a home at the request of
the police who had searched the home under a
warrant issued by another magistrate, viewed
the evidence, and issued a search warrant,
which was immediately executed. State v.
Romero, 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983).
Particular description.
The requirement of particularity of description, and what constitutes such a description,
is set forth clearly and at length in Allen v.
Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135 P.2d 242, 249,
modified on rehearing and petition denied, 103
Utah 599, 139 P.2d 233 (1943).
Plain view.
Objects falling within the plain view of a police officer from a position where he is entitled
to be are not the subject of an unlawful search.
In re K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981).
Under the plain-view exception to the search
warrant requirement, a warrantless seizure of
items is justified if the officer doing the seizing
is lawfully present where the search and seizure occur, the items are in plain view, and the
items are clearly incriminating. State v.
Romero, 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983).

Juveniles.
Juvenile was entitled to the constitutional
protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures. In re K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044 (Utah
1981).

Private searches.
The protections of the fourth amendment of
the U.S. Constitution do not apply to searches
or seizures made by persons other than government officers and agents. State v. Newbold,
581 P.2d 991 (Utah 1972).
Unreasonable private searches are not subject to the protection of this section. State v.
Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988).
A search conducted by a private person acting as the agent of a governmental authority is
not a private search, and the burden of establishing governmental involvement in a private
search rests upon the party objecting to the
evidence. State v. Watts. 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah
1988).

Liquor.
Where police officers were investigating
rooming house under city ordinance to determine if liquor was being sold there, and proprietor during investigation drank from bottle of
liquor and gave some to another person, the
seizure of the liquor bv the officers was legal.
Salt Lake City v. Wight, 60 Utah 108, 205 P.
900 (1922).
Unchallenged entry of liquor control commission agents into club to determine if it
would make unlawful sales to them was not a
warrantless search and did not become so by
their purchase of any alcoholic drink.

P r o b a b l e cause.
Since our Constitution requires a showing of
probable cause to support a search warrant, an
affidavit based merely on information and belief fails to meet the constitutional requirements. Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Utah 471, 93 P.2d
920 (1939).
Search warrant which stated, among other
things, that deputy had reason to believe property was stolen, with an inventory of such
property attached to affidavit, that evidence
tended to show felony had been committed and
that certain witnesses had revealed information as to person committing felony showed
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sufficient probable cause. State v Smelser. 23
Utah 347, 463 P.2d 562, cert, denied. 398 U.S.
966, 90 S. Ct. 2181. 26 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1970).
Under the fourth amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, no probable cause justifying seizure of defendant's truck without warrant existed where the sole justification for the seizure
was officer's belief that the truck had been involved in another crime and the record was
void of any evidence to support that belief.
State v. Richards, 26 Utah 2d 318, 489 P.2d
422 (1971).
Where police officer received report describing robbery suspect as a black man with a
scraggly beard, wearing a green field jacket
and blue stocking cap and e a r n i n g a .22 caliber pearl-handled revolver, then spotted an automobile occupied by two black men. followed
and stopped car, and upon observing that passenger had scraggly beard and wore green field
jacket, searched vehicle and found blue stocking cap and pearl-handled .22 caliber revolver,
he had probable cause to search vehicle and
arrest passenger, and evidence taken from car
was properly admitted as evidence at robbery
prosecution. State v. Dixon, 531 P.2d 1301
r u t a h 1975).
— V e r a c i t y of w i t n e s s .
The average neighbor witness is not the type
of informant in need of independent proof of
reliability or veracity in determining probable
cause for issuance of a search warrant. State v.
Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Utah Ct. App.), cert,
denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).
R e a s o n a b l e expectation of privacy.
Defendant could not have reasonably expected privacy as to the marijuana plants
growing in open view in a field, and the warrantless seizure of the marijuana plants was
lawful, where the deputies discovered the defendant along with the marijuana plants in an
open field of a rural area with no dwelling
houses or other buildings nearby, the deputies
saw no gates where the road entered the field
nor any no trespassing signs, the road had
been patrolled on previous occasions and there
was nothing to indicate to the deputies that
they were entering private property, the road
was used by other landowners in the area as a
means of access to their lands, and defendant
did not actually hold title to the field, but had
signed an earnest money agreement and intended to purchase it. State v. Shreve. 667 P.2d
590 (Utah 1983).
S c o p e of s e a r c h .
The limitation on the scope of a search pursuant to a warrant is drawn in terms of those
areas where it is reasonable to believe that the
listed evidence could be located, and is not limited to areas where most people would place

the listed items of evidence. State v. Romero
660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983).
Search.
Where police officer lawfully entered upon
defendant's property at night by a pathway
leading to the front door, and the purpose of
such entry was for other than searching defendant's truck, and while on the property police
officer observed, with the aid of a flashlight, in
plain view through an unobstructed window in
the truck, stolen property, police officer's observation did not constitute a search within the
meaning of the constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches, and the warrantless seizure of the stolen property was not
the result of an unconstitutional search and
the property was admissible into evidence.
State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah), cert, denied,
454 U.S. 1057, 102 S. Ct. 606, 70 L. Ed. 2d 595
(1981).
Search incident to a r r e s t
Where police recognized woman passenger in
defendant's car as a person for whose arrest a
warrant was outstanding, stopped the car to
arrest her, and in the course of the encounter
asked to see defendant's driver's license, then
radioed for a check on warrants outstanding
against him, found there was one and arrested
him, they had acted correctly, and a weapon
found on defendant's person during the search
incident to arrest was properly admitted at his
trial on concealed weapons charge. State v.
Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976).
Where police officers on a rooftop, observing
prostitution activity, saw through an open window of an adjoining building a man inject a
substance from a bottle into his and others'
arms, and then return the bottle to an adjoining bedroom, the police had probable cause to
arrest for a drug violation and to seize the bottle which was in plain view in the adjoining
bedroom. State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125 (Utah
1977).
Warrantless search of the room in which defendant was lawfully arrested was valid even
though defendant was handcuffed while in the
room where the search was made; evidence
found in a wastebasket in the room was in
plain view. State v. Austin, 584 P.2d 853 (Utah
1978).
Fact that search may have been conducted
immediately before the formal arrest does not
invalidate the search nor preclude its characterization as being incident to the arrest where
the search and arrest are substantially contemporaneous, and probable cause for the arrest exists independent of evidence obtained
from the search. State v. White, 577 P.2d 552
( U u h 1978); In re K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044 (Utah
1981).
Where police officer had probable cause to
make warrantless arrest of juvenile for unlaw-
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ful possession of alcohol independent of evidence obtained in warrantless search of pickup
truck in which juvenile was seated, and the
search and arrest of juvenile were substantially contemporaneous in time, and juvenile
was standing near the truck a t the time of the
arrest, the search and seizure of beer in truck's
bed and the search of truck's cab and seizure of
marijuana found under a floor m a t and in a
tape case that was not a sealed, closed container were proper searches and seizures incident to an arrest. In re K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044
(Utah 1981).
Search warrant.
—Validity.
The Utah Supreme Court abandoned the
Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged standard for determining the validity of a search warrant and
adopted the new standard, which looks at the
totality of the circumstances and holds that the
affidavit should be viewed in its entirety and
in a common sense fashion. S t a t e v. Espinoza,
723 P.2d 420 tfJtah \9S6>.
Search without w a r r a n t
—Delay before search.
Police delay before a warrantless search does
not necessarily negate exigency of circumstance. State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah
1987).
Officers' failure to avail themselves of an
earlier opportunity to obtain a w a r r a n t does
not automatically preclude t h e m from acting
upon exigent circumstances arising thereafter,
and the fact that the exigency may have been
foreseeable at the time the decision was made
to forego or postpone obtaining a warrant does
not control the legality of a subsequent warrantless search triggered by t h a t exigency.
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987).
—Propriety.
The state carries the burden of showing that
a warrantless search was lawful. State v.
Larocco, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (1990).
S t a n d i n g to object to s e a r c h .
Defendant lacked standing to object to
search of automobile and attache case found
therein where he conceded t h a t he did not own.
the property searched and failed to show that
he had any legitimate expectation of privacy in
such effects. State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1*334
(Utah 1984).
Defendant had no standing to object to a
search of the vehicle he was driving, where the
police investigation revealed t h a t the vehicle
was registered to a person other than defendant, and there was no showing t h a t he had
driven it with the permission of the owner or
t h a t he had borrowed it under circumstances
that would imply permissive use. State v.
Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987).
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Defendant lacked standing to object to a
search of an automobile that he had stolen
since he had no possessory or proprietary interest in the stolen auto. State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d
441 (Utah 1978).
—Stolen vehicle.
Where prior to a warrantless search, police
knew that the car was registered in defendant's name and that it was parked in front of
defendant's home, the search itself corroborated other information indicating that it was
the stolen vehicle, defendant had not declared
beforehand that he had no interest in the vehicle, and proving that the car was stolen is one
of the critical facts to be established a t trial,
defendant has standing to challenge the legality of the search. State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89
(Utah C t App. 1987), rev'd on other grounds,
135 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (1990).
S t o p p i n g for c r i m i n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n .
Police officer had an objective credible reason to enter a laundromat and ask defendants
what they were doing and for identification
where he knew that there had been several
thefts in the area, he observed the defendants
alone in the laundromat, he knew from previous encounters that they were from out of town
and had been in possession of contraband and a
bag of coins. State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d
103 (Utah 1980).
Police officers were justified in making investigation of defendant and a companion who
were found late at night in an area known to
have a high rate of burglaries, the two had
made suspicious movements while driving
their car, one officer saw radio equipment in
the car after he found the two ,with their car
stopped and its hood raised, and defendant
could not produce any identification; fact that
during the investigation officers questioned
the two in separate police cars, after giving the
Miranda warnings, did not violate defendant's
rights where there was no evidence that he
was unduly restrained; and, officers had probable cause to make a warrantless arrest of defendant where, during the questioning, defendant's companion, after having been confronted with differences in his story with, the
defendant's, admitted to stealing the radio and
implicated defendant in the theft. State v.
Ballenberger, 652 P.2d 927 (Utah 1982).
Police officer's stopping of a driver was not a
random stop constituting an unreasonable seizure where the officer knew the driving license
of the driver had been revoked and had a reasonable suspicion that it was still revoked at
the time he stopped the driver; where, after
questioning the driver, the officer learned that
the license was in fact still revoked, the officer
properly arrested the driver for driving while
his license was revoked. State v. Gibson, 666
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P.2d 1302 iUtah), cert, denied. 464 U.S. 894,
104 S. Ct. 241, 78 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1983).

Cited in State v. Droneburg. 781 P.2d 1301
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
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Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the
press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as
libelous is true, and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends,
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the
law and the fact.
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